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Independent films received four of the five 1997 Academy Award
nominations for "Best Picture." The Crying Game,' Pulp Fiction,2 and
Four Weddings and a Funera reached previously unheard of box office
figures for independent films in the United States. Hundreds of
independent submissions flood film festivals each year. Established
independent companies like Miramax, New Line, and October have been
purchased by studios. The independent film business, by all accounts, is an
increasingly important component of an increasingly large American
industry.
This success follows a period in which numerous independent film
companies failed as the motion picture industry became more centralized.
Time, Warner and Turner merged (after Turner had acquired New Line and
Castle Rock), as did Disney-ABC and Paramount-Viacom. 4  Meanwhile,
the average cost of producing and marketing films has skyrocketed-
Titanic' alone cost well over $200 million to produce and has generated
theatrical gross receipts of $1.8 billion.6  This staggering success
*
Mr. Frumes is a partner in the Century City entertainment law firm, Alexander, Nau,
Lawrence & Frumes; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974; B.A., Claremont Men's College, 1971.
1. THE CRYING GAME (Miramax 1992).
2. PULP FICTION (Miramax 1994).
3. FouR WEDDINGS AND A FuNERAL (PolyGram Filmed Ent. 1994).
4. Turner acquired New Line and Castle Rock. See Rex Weiner, Kerkorian: Lion King
Once Again, VARIETY, July 22-28, 1996, at 1. Later, Time, Warner and Turner merged. Id.
Disney acquired ABC. See Harvey Enchin, Canuck Companies Make a Deal To Merge,
VARIETY, Sept. 7-13, 1998, at 42. Viacom acquired Paramount. See Jenny Hontz & Martin
Peers, Ailing Webs Girdfor Change, VARIETY, Sept. 20-26, 1998, at 19.
5. TITANIC (Twentieth Century Fox 1997).
6. Titanic's approximately $1.2 billion in international box office gross receipts exceeded
the cumulative international box office receipts for every studio's entire slate of pictures in 1998
except for Buena Vista. Jon Herskovitz, Great '98for Japan, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 26, 1999, at
16. As an example of its dominance, Titanic alone accounted for $220 million of Japan's 1998
box office receipts-approximately 13 percent of all such revenues in Japan from all films that
year. Id.
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encourages studios to expend their resources on developing the next
Titanic,7 Jurassic Park,' or Star Wars9 and control the means to exploit
such pictures in every possible way.
Such size and consolidation may foreshadow a day where the world's
communication, entertainment and even educational needs are controlled
by a small number of international behemoths. Does this signal a new
trend or merely a continuation of traditional studio power?
The American film industry is of vital importance. The entire
entertainment business has become essential to the American economy as
perhaps our second most successful export industry.'0 It is even more
central to the economy of Los Angeles and California."
The international cultural impact of American films is perhaps the
primary way America influences people throughout the world. Thus, to the
extent most of our programming is produced by or for the studios, they are
essential to our economic and cultural well-being.
But independent production also has become an important economic
factor 12and remains the source of new ideas and new talent necessary for
the film industry to flourish. Thus, despite the inherent tension between the
studios and independent producers, the independent side of this equation
can and should be nourished. Independent productions help maintain the
industry's economic and artistic strength and resiliency, which
consequentially benefits the studios. Steven Spielberg has said, "I think the
independent revolution is the most exciting thing that's happened since the
French New Wave. The independent film has always been with us, but its
never had this commercial reception."'
3
7. TrrANic (Twentieth Century Fox 1997).
8. JURASSIC PARK (Universal 1993).
9. STAR WARS (Twentieth Century Fox 1977).
10. Cf. Don Groves, Mouse: All-Mighty, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 13, 1997, at 5, 43. The
studios reported theatrical box office for their films in excess of S5.5 billion outside of North
America in 1996, an increase of $400 million over the previous year. Id.
11. Robert Lansing, Brand Name: Entertainment Has Become the Defming Industryfor the
City of Los Angeles, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Dec. 7, 1998, at S-1. From 1990 to 1997, film,
television and commercial production "boosted employment by more than 95,000 jobs" in the
Los Angeles area, becoming the fifth largest city employer with 239,000 employees. Id. The
industry "infused $10.5 billion into the local economy from 1992 through 1996." Id. "By some
estimates, entertainment at its broadest definition will grow to as large as a $40-billion annual
business in California by 2000." James Bates, In Local Economy, Hollywood is Star, L.A.
TmmEs, Jan. 18, 1998, at Al.
12. Kenneth Turan, The ThrillIsn't Gone, L.A. Tnms, Dec. 28, 1998, at Fl, F4.
13. Id.
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A. The Studio System and Independent Production
One commentator described the studios as:
[Mieshing into a vast interlocking system, unified by
standardized production and. marketing practices, a code of
acceptable content, and an increasingly stable system of
technical and narrative conventions. These manifested a
narrower sense of audience interest and public taste, which in
turn limited what passed in Hollywood as a viable story
property. The prospect of anything truly innovative or
distinctive being produced in Hollywood was becoming more
14remote ....
Perhaps surprisingly, this writer was analyzing the film studios of the mid-
1930s.' 5
To a great extent, the studio system was held together by three crucial
elements: (1) strong-willed individual leadership; (2) control of talent
through exclusive contracts; and (3) merged film production, distribution
and exhibition capabilities. Individual leadership changed over time,
causing studios to grow, collapse, and rebuild. Nevertheless, control over
talent, distribution and exhibition remained the essence of the system.
A 1948 Supreme Court antitrust ruling and resultant consent decrees
required the studios to sell their theaters, which started a revolution in the
film industry. 16 The Justice Department argued that such a ruling was
needed to diversify film content, that only by opening distribution channels
"to all may the fullest diversity of film content be had.," 7 The Justice
Department suggested the need "to satisfy the wide variety of tastes
possessed by the potential American film audience, rather than a
standardized mass product adapted to profitable exhibition in a controlled
market."' 8
Change continued as individual actors and directors loosened the grip
of exclusive services agreements, and began to work on a picture-by-
picture basis. New technology, in the form of television, challenged the
vision of studio leadership. One result was a substantial increase in
14. THOMAS SCHATZ, THE GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM 198 (1988).
15. Id.
16. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). For a good discussion
of changes in exhibition practices at that time, see Ralph Cassady, Jr., Impact of the Paramount
Decision on Motion Picture Distribution andPrice Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 150 (1958).
17. OTTo FRIEDRicH, CITY OF NETS 349 (1997).
18. Id.
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independent production and the emergence of large, stand-alone exhibitors
and independent theater owners.
Nevertheless, the apparent demise of the original studio system-
while causing great shifts in exhibition and talent-has not resulted in
independent film producers holding any meaningful power. Rather,
collapse of the studio system only changed the nature of the studios'
stranglehold on the film business: the increasing cost of production and
marketing19 allows the studios, due to their control over available capital
and film libraries, to build distribution systems (even without exhibition),
which in turn exclude most competition. As the studios bid up the price of
talent2° and marketing (despite their complaints about cost), they make it
exceedingly difficult for smaller, independent companies to compete-the
most important actors, writers and directors insist upon the best possible
distribution for their pictures and/or nobody else can afford their salaries.
This centralization of capital, production and distribution helps keep
the motion picture system unfriendly or even inaccessible to most
independent producers. Yet, despite such economic centralization of
commercial filmmaking, non-studio films have grown in number and may
continue to do so-even if they usually cannot find major (or any
substantial) distribution.
Reasons for this growth in independent films include the fact that
filmmaking is also an art form and, as happened in past centuries with
novels and paintings, new artists cannot be denied by censorship, social
pressure or economic deprivation. Economic hardship even becomes a
source of creative inspiration, if not a badge of true independence. Film
production is a democratic medium, particularly with new technology
which allows those with little money an opportunity to make films with
consumer equipment.2
19. Leonard Klady, Studios Ring Out '96 with B.O. Up 7.9%16, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 2, 1997,
at 1, 26. The Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") announced that studio pictures
averaged $36.4 million to produce and $17.7 million to market. Id. However, some observers
believed that average marketing costs per picture were actually in the range of $25-30 million.
Id.
20. Columbia's decision to sign Jim Carrey for $20 million to star in The Cable Guy not
only increased the fees payable to other "A" lead actors, but also increased the salaries available
for many other artists on studio films. Dan Cox, Exex Stand Tough on Big Ticket Pix, VARIETY,
Apr. 7-13, 1997, at 32; see Ted Johnson, Can $20 Mii Fill the Bill, VARIETY, Dec. 9-15, 1996, at
1.
21. However, even more access to increasingly powerful equipment "does not automatically
make for better results .... All of us today are able to walk into an art store and buy-
inexpensively-pigments and supplies that the Renaissance painters would have paid fortunes
for. And yet, how many of us paint on their level todayT' WALTER MuRcH, IN THE BLINK OF
AN EYE: A PERSPECTIVE ON FILM EDITING, 107 (1995).
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Filmmaking and film watching are also deeply rooted international
activities which many nations see as essential to develop or symbolize their
unique cultural attributes. Finally, production is necessary for television,
advertising, educational, non-theatrical, and industrial purposes, thus
assuring new artists a means of developing their craft. The existence of
such independent production is a reason to ask how to expedite that process
and make it easier for such filmmakers to bring their work to the world's
audience, rather than a justification for continued centralization and
dependence upon a few large and often artistically stifling studios.
22
This Article discusses problems facing independent producers and
whether-and, if so, how-independents can be freed sufficiently from
studio dominance to enhance the values which arise from such
independence. Collective bargaining agreements with those who are
employed to make films (directors, writers, actors and crew) have assisted
in maintaining studio power. If the more numerous, but less economically
influential, independent producers organize to reach their own agreements
with the powerful guilds and unions, it could increase the viability of
independent filmmaking, loosen the binds of the studios on certain kinds of
production, and provide additional work for many who, for various reasons,
are not regularly employed by the studios.
Some have argued that studios hire and promote on the basis of sex,
race, age, and other biases. Certainly the result, no matter how attained, is
less diverse than the audience for film and television productions. This
problem might be addressed with additional resources and more theaters
available for independent productions.
To approach these goals, one must examine how the film industry
tends toward stagnation and centralization and try to point to long-range
goals filmmakers might place above the short-term gains which have
become so common in the increasingly centralized American economy.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION
The birth of "independent" production probably started with those
early producers who attempted to fight the Motion Picture Trust Company
("Trust") by producing films without licenses. On January 1, 1909, the
Trust came into existence. It consisted of nine film "manufacturers," led
by Thomas Edison, which owned or claimed ownership in motion picture
camera or projection patents. These companies included two French
22. For a discussion about the eight year development journey of screenwriters Joan Didion
and John Gregory Dunne with Disney on Up Close & Personal, see JOHN GREGORY DUNNE,
MONSTER 97-98 (1997).
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manufacturers and one distributor which imported European films into the
U.S., banded together to solidify their patents.
23
The Trust's members entered into an agreement with the only source
of film stock, Eastman Kodak, thus creating a monopoly in cameras, film,
and projectors-three items essential for filmmaking. 24 They licensed each
other the right to utilize such controlled items, and refused to provide
licenses to others. The only way to make films legally was through the
Trust.25
However, production was not a particularly complicated endeavor in
the early years of this century. Most films were "shorts" lasting between
five and ten minutes.26 The Trust initially ordered that no film was to be
longer than one reel, and later two reels." Cameras were stationary, simply
being pointed at the subject. No major studios or facilities were needed
and independent filmmakers attempting to create films outside the Trust
located second-hand equipment and film stock. Many of these independent
filmmakers ended up moving outside of the New York area, where the
Trust companies were based, to avoid attack-legal and otherwise.
Independent producers formed a competitive entity-the Independent
Motion Picture Company. After the Trust formed its own distribution
entity, General Film Company, the independents formed Motion Picture
Distributing Company, with Carl Laemmle in charge.2' Lawsuits were
filed by the hundreds. Cameras were confiscated. Productions were shut
down. The independents became even more adaptable. By 1915, General
Film Company lost a major court decision and, as multiple reel films were
imported from Europe, the motion picture industry began to change
dramatically. 29 Actors were becoming stars, the independents were
becoming established in California, and the Trust was losing its power.
Although filmmakers worked in Philadelphia, Chicago, Cuba and
other locales to escape the Trust, most production moved to Southern
California.3" The companies which later evolved into the major film
23. DAVID PUTNAM, THE UNDECLARED WAR 47-49, 60-61 (1996).
24. See LEWIS JACOBS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN FILM: A CRITICAL HISTORY 81-85
(1939).
25. Id.; see NEIL GABLER, AN EMPIRE OF THEIR OWN: How THE JEWS INVENTED
HOLLYWOOD 57-64 (1988).
26. BOSLEY CROWTHER, THE LION'S SHARE: THE STORY OF AN ENTERTAINMENT EMPIRE
34 (1957).
27. Id.
28. LESLIE WOOD, THE MIRACLE OF THE MOVIES 170-83 (1947).
29. GARTH JOwETT, FILM: THE DEMOCRATIC ART 34 (1976); see WOOD, supra note 28, at
183 (referring to the events of 1915).
30. WOOD, supra note 28, at 224-28.
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studios began in this way as early independent filmmakers. These included
Adolph Zukor (Famous Players/Paramount), Carl Laemmle (Universal) and
William Fox (Twentieth Century Fox).
As the Hollywood film industry became structured into studios,
"independent" production could best be identified as that production
occurring outside the studios.3 It arose on occasion as a result of new
companies being formed. For example, production companies started by
actors Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks, with
director D.W. Griffith, led to the formation of United Artists.3 2 Other well-
known producers or directors raised money to form their own production
entities, such as D.W. Griffith33 after he left United Artists (unsuccessfully)
and David 0. Selznick (far more successfully). 4 Samuel Goldwyn was
also an independent for many years. But with the studios' stranglehold on
capital, talent, production, distribution and exhibition, independent
producers accounted for a small portion of films each year.
By the time the initial studio system began to unravel in the mid to
late 1940s, independent production arose in a number of ways. Initially,
stars and major directors, formerly attached to the studios by long-term
contracts, 5 began their own production entities. Nevertheless, most of
their pictures were studio productions in which they starred. 36  By the
1950s production began directly for television, leading to companies such
as Desilu and ZIV. Moreover, new companies moved into film production
from exhibition or distribution.
31. The definition of an "independent" can be debated at length. In this Article, studio
production is being distinguished from films produced outside the studio system. From the
distribution perspective, Ira Deutchman, then President of Fine Line and a Vice President of New
Line, its parent company, suggested calling such entities "'niche' companies." He primarily
distinguished niche companies from the studios in their marketing approach. Studio marketing is
driven by the attempt to obtain "large numbers" while niche companies attempt to "identify a
market that is currently underserved by the studios," evaluating its potential and then determining
the "costs inherent in trying to reach it." He suggested that niche companies could be "flexible
enough to react to the marketplace" more quickly than the larger studios. IRA DEUTCHMAN, THE
MOVIE BusINEss BOOK 321 (Jason E. Squire ed., Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1983).
32. See STEVEN BACH, FINAL CuT 35-42 (1985).
33. See Janet Wasko, D.W. Griffith and the Banks: A Case Study in Film Financing, 30 J.U.
FILM ASS'N 15 (1978).
34. DAVID THOMSON, SHOWMAN: THE LIFE OF DAVID 0. SELZNICK 345-49 (1992).
35. See generally De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App.
1944) (upholding enforcement of the seven-year limitation on employment agreements).
36. For example, despite producing films such as It's A Wonderful Life and State of The
Union, Liberty-founded by Frank Capra-lasted only a few years. FRIEDRICH, supra note 17, at
350.
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Also in the 1950s, opportunities arose due to the studios' loss of
control over their theaters. The studios stopped producing "B" movies
(which had been cut back originally during World War II due to shortages
of film stock).37  This also gave rise to the development of drive-ins
(particularly in the South and West), and led to other changes in the manner
in which films were exhibited, especially as television grew.38 As a result,
Sam Arkoff and Jim Nicholson successfully began American International
Pictures, followed by Roger Corman's New World and his successful
importation of European films.
39
During this time, John Cassavetes financed and produced his own
independent films in addition to European films. He eventually formed his
own distribution company after a less than satisfying studio experience.
There was even a period during the 1960s and early 1970s where the
studios were considered by many to be a dying structure. In the early
1970s, a number of filmmakers, including Steve McQueen, Barbra
Streisand, Peter Bogdanovich, Frances Ford Coppola, and others joined
forces in different combinations to produce films through their own
companies (including Allied Artists and The Director's Company) without
studio interference. Coppola began American Zoetrope as an interesting
but ultimately financially unsuccessful attempt to create a new,
independent version of a studio.4" However, the traditional studios
regained their position of prominence and seeming invincibility as income
grew from cable television and home video. As a result, many independent
37. In 1939, 761 motion pictures were released; in 1945, only 377 pictures were released.
Independent producers, who traditionally produced more "B" movies, were particularly hurt, as
they had less access to facilities and equipment. JOwETT, supra note 29, at 310.
38. Cassady, supra note 16, at 180 n.-171-72. In 1948, there were 189,900 television sets in
theU.S. Id. at 180 n. 172. By the beginning of 1956, the total was 36,900,000. Id. From the end
of the War until 1956, weekly theatre attendance dropped from 90,000,000 to 46,530,000. Id. at
180 n.171.
39. See SAM ARKoFF, FLYING THROUGH HOLLYWOOD BY THE SEAT OF MY PANTS (1992);
ROGER CORMAN & JIM JEROME, How I MADE A HUNDRED Movms IN HOLLYWOOD AND
NEVER LOST A DIDE (1990).
40. NICHOLAS KENT, NAKED HOLLYWOOD 158 (1991). Following its initial failure after
being formed by Coppola and George Lucas in 1969, Zoetrope was resurrected when Coppola
purchased a Los Angeles studio complex a decade later, only to flounder again, primarily on the
inflated budget of One From the Heart. Id. at 159-60; see Mike Bygrave & Joan Goodman, Meet
Me inLas Vegas, AMERICAN FILM, Oct. 1981, at 38-43, 84; JON LEWIS, WHOM GOD WISHES TO
DESTROY ... FRANCIS COPPOLA AND THE NEW HOLLYWOOD 1, 3, 8-10 (1995).
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companies failed,4 and economic centralization went from potentially
illegal to an accepted corporate goal.
The international nature of the industry and the increasing amount of
capital required to begin new media ventures have helped cement the
power of the studios. The lack of antitrust enforcement, especially under
former actor and Screen Actors Guild ("SAG') President Ronald Reagan,
accelerated this conglomeration. As the cost of studio production and
marketing soared, the difference between studio and independent films has
become even more glaring.
In recent years, the artistic and, in some cases, commercial, success of
independent films like Howard's End,42 sex, lies and videotape,43 The
Crying Game,44 and Four Weddings and a Funeral,45 did not go unnoticed
by the studios. Nor did they overlook the critical success, best exemplified
by the 1997 Academy Award nominations where four of the five "best
picture" nominees were independent productions,4 as well as other
critically acclaimed independent film releases in 199647 such as The Big
Night," Lone Star,49 Breaking the Waves,
0 and Sling Blade.51
Despite the overwhelming number of independent films produced
which do not succeed theatrically, the increasing (although still small)
number of such films managing large box office revenues led to numerous
corporate transactions. Merchant Ivory entered into a distribution
agreement with Disney. 2 New Line established Fine Line Pictures. 3
Turner purchased Castle Rock and New Line (and then Time Warner
41. These independent companies included Cannon, De Laurentiis Entertainment Group,
Atlantic, Trans-World Entertainment, Cinecom, Avenue, MCEG, Empire, 21st Century,
Hemdale, Vestron, Orion, Weintraub, Cineplex Odeon Films and, more recently, Prism, Carolco,
Cinergi, Goldwyn, and IRS.
42. HoWARD'S END (Merchant-Ivory Prods. 1992).
43. SEX, LIES AND VIDEOTAPE (Miramax Films 1989).
44. THE CRYING GAME (Miramax Films 1992).
45. FouR WEDDINGS AND A FUNERAL (PolyGram Filmed Ent. 1994).
46. SECRETS & LIES (October Films 1996), FARGO (PolyGran Filmed Ent. 1996), SHINE
(Fine Line 1996), and THE ENGLISH PATIENT (Miramax Films 1996).
47. Rex Weiner & Andrew Hindes, Indies' Lesson in '96: More May Mean Less, DAILY
VARIETY, Jan. 10, 1997, at 12, 64 (reviewing independent films released in 1996).
48. THE BIG NIGHT (Samuel Goldwyn Co. 1996).
49. LONE STAR (Columbia Pictures 1996).
50. BREAKING THE WAVES (October Films 1996).
51. SLING BLADE (Miramax Films 1996).
52. See Hugo Davenport, Cannes Turns the Tide from This Year's Cannes Film Festival,
DAILY TEL. (London), May 27, 1995, at 1.
53. Catherine Jordan, Move Over Clint: Tough-Gal Films Start a Stampede, L.A. TIMEs,
Apr. 26, 1994, at 1.
1999]
532 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENTLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19
acquired Turner).54 Disney purchased Miramax. 5 PolyGram acquired a
number of independent production companies, including Working Title,
Propaganda and Interscope, and then was purchased itself by Universal. 6
Fox started a new distribution division, Fox Searchlight, to access new
talent and independent producers." Paramount also started such a
division. 8 Metromedia acquired Orion, MCEG and Goldwyn, and then
MGM-UA acquired Metromedia. 9  Universal acquired October Films. 
6
Also, studio distribution agreements were entered into by many of the
larger independent producers, including Beacon, Cinergi, Lakeshore,
Mandalay, New Regency, and Spyglass Entertainment.61 The line between
independents and studios has blurred as a result of such transactions.
Whether studio ownership, distribution or financing in these
situations is successful will undoubtedly differ from one circumstance to
another; however, the importance to the studios of non-studio production
and off-balance sheet production financing, and the corollary importance of
studio distribution to independents, has been highlighted by these and
similar events.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH INDEPENDENCE
A. The Failure of Independent Production Companies
Why have so many independent production companies failed in the
last decade? In one sense, the reasons are as numerous as the failures.
However, some trends are clear.
Undercapitalization is always a problem in the film industry. Given
the increasing cost of production and marketing, in addition to the inherent
risk of each film production, huge amounts of money can be spent before a
54. Steven Galloway, Like a Rock, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 16, 1995, at S23; Monica
Roman, Wall Street Sweet on In-The-Black October, VARIETY, Oct. 21-27, 1996, at 19.
55. Todd Lothery, Art of the Matter, NEws & OBSERVER, Feb. 28, 1999, at G1.
56. See Claudia Eller, PolyGram's Challenge Is Separating Serious Bids from Press
Releases, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1998, at Dl.
57. Lothery, supra note 55, at G1.
58. Id.
59. Carl DiOrio, PolyGram's Open House Held for Kerkorian Today, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Aug. 26, 1998, at 1.
60. Id.
61. Claudia Eller, Spyglass Offers Disney Lower-Risk Deals, L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 1998, at
D5; Kirk Honeycutt and Stephen Galloway, Dis Looks through Spyglass, DAILY VARIETY, at 1,
33.
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hit is released.62 Therefore, any business plan has to consider such
substantial risks. Some companies attempt to do this by pre-selling
distribution rights, thus reducing their downside, but endangering their
potential profits. Others attempt to create value by finding ways to retain
talent without large up-front salaries. Another method of reducing risk is to
structure joint ventures to share costs.
Another apparent solution during the 1980s was to raise equity
funding, usually from the public, in order to have a cushion against failure.
However, such windfalls created numerous other problems and often gave
companies a false sense of security based on the belief they could compete
with and act like the studios-a major threat to independent filmmaking. It
is often the very sense of danger and risk which creates originality, tight
budgets, hard work and cooperation. Public funding reduced the
motivation for such characteristics and led to companies such as Weintraub
Entertainment, where hundreds of millions of dollars resulted only in films
such as My Stepmother Is an Alien.
63
A second major problem for independents is excessive overhead.
Obviously, ongoing overhead costs, whether for personnel, benefits,
facilities, underperforming libraries, development costs, or production and
marketing, can eat away at a company's capital. Most independents have a
limited time to prove themselves, given their capital base. In light of the
risk inherent in film production and the long period of time before most
films, no matter how successful, actually result in revenue, large overhead
and interest can dangerously shorten the time a company has available to
succeed.
Even when a production company does succeed, that success may
result in increased overhead and production costs, eventually leading to
corporate collapse. One company which was unable to survive long
enough to outlast its long-awaited hits was Orion, which released Dances
With Wolves 64 late in its existence and was forced to sell The Addams
Family65 to Paramount before its completion. Vestron, which produced
Dirty Dancing,6 was among several companies which created one hit and
then failed to repeat their success, thus leading to their collapse. On a
smaller scale, Atlantic-with Valley Girl67 and Teen Wo/ 8-suffered the
62. See NORMAN G. RUDMAN, THE MOvIE BusINESS BOOK 190-97 (Jason E. Squire Ad.
1983).
63. MY STEPMOTHER IS AN ALIEN (Weintraub Ent. 1988).
64. DANCES WITH WOLVES (Orion 1990).
65. THE ADDAMS FAMILY (Paramount Pictures 1991).
66. DIRTY DANCING (Vestron 1987).
67. VALLEY GIRL (Valley 2000 1983).
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same fate. One problem with substantial overhead and interest is that it
reduces a company's time in which to get a hit film released and to collect
resulting revenues. Eventually, this leads to failure unless the amount of
capitalization is substantially greater than what the company has committed
to spend in its initial years.
One reason independent companies are not able to generate revenues
fast enough to survive is that they control only limited or no distribution
facilities. This is common with many independent companies, although
theatrical distributors like Goldwyn, Orion, Republic, and Cannon have
also ultimately gone out of business or been subsumed by studios. The
increasing cost of marketing a film nationally makes theatrical distribution
a dangerous business for independent companies. Even those companies
which raised large sums of capital-such as Weintraub and Savoy-found
that they had a limited time to develop, produce and distribute successful
pictures.
Each motion picture needs to be seen as an independent business,
although it must be consistent with the business plan for the overall
company. If films are made with no expectation except that eventually one
will become a hit, corporate failure is almost guaranteed. The means of
financing and marketing each picture must be part of the decision to
produce it. The riskiness inherent in film production has seen brilliant
actors, directors, writers, producers and executives fail when attempting to
structure independent production companies. While independent
production continues in great quantity, usually on a picture-by-picture
basis,6 9 such corporate failures have obviously led to the conclusion by
many that size is the best protection against failure.7"
B. The Difficulty of Single-Picture Financing
Independent productions7 are normally financed through pre-sales,
bank loans, equity or non-picture collateral, gap financing, and completion
bonds. 72 Independent filmmaking in many cases requires more time spent
68. TEEN WOLF (Atlantic 1985).
69. Claudia Eller, He's Leaving Las Vegas--and Big Studios-for Creative Control, L.A.
TIMES, May 23, 1997, at D4.
70. But certain artists continue to prioritize their artistic vision and control, forgoing large
fees and budgets. Id For example, Mike Figgis, after the success of Leaving Las Vegas, decided
to write and direct a film with independent international distributor Summit Entertainment
budgeted under six million dollars in order to maintain control. Id.
71. See supra note 31 for a discussion regarding how to define "independent" pictures.
72. For a discussion regarding how independent production companies developed, see
WOOD, supra note 28, at 224-28.
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raising money than producing films. At a minimum, this requires the
ability to contract with one or more distribution companies for each film
project before it is produced, or having the property's distribution and
presale handled by the same people who are going to produce it.
A "presale" is the licensing of a pending film project, rather than a
completed picture, typically to international territories, based upon some
combination of budget, cast, director, producer, script and marketing
tools.73 Many independent producers utilize presale agreements as
collateral to obtain production loans, which are then used (sometimes in
conjunction with additional sales "estimates" from a reputable sales agent)
to finance the film. For a bank to agree to such a loan, of course, there
must be some guarantee that the motion picture will be completed on a
sufficiently timely basis to be delivered to the entities who have purchased
the film. This is accomplished by obtaining a completion bond, which is
essentially insurance that a film will either be finished by its producer, or
will be taken over and completed by the company that issued the bond.
An independent production must simultaneously balance many
factors, including: satisfying a bank and bond company; pursuing,
documenting and solidifying presales; completing adequate budgets and
schedules; finalizing the script; and, perhaps most difficult, obtaining and
securing a cast and director. If any of these aspects fall short, the entire
project can collapse. Many films are presold and then never completed and
delivered. The market's awareness of this problem reduces the prices
available when a film is presold. Thus, in many ways producers are selling
their potential profit margin in exchange for the ability to produce a picture.
With lower revenues available from presales and the cost of documenting
such agreements, providing letters of credit or other necessary security,
obtaining sufficient documentation to satisfy banks, bond companies and
other insurers, interest, finance charges, and completion bond premiums,
the amount actually available for any given production is stretched
extremely tight and the potential "upside" in the event of a successful film
is substantially reduced.
This process puts a premium on the ability to budget a film properly.
The budget must be realistic for the script and yet take into account these
various financing problems. There is also an ongoing balancing act
between the film's schedule, availability of actors and director, and time
needed for presales, loans and bonding to be completed. Actors can
become unavailable during this process, which then leads to problems with
73. See Arnold Kopelson, One Producer's Inside View of Foreign and Domestic Pre-Sales
in the Independent Financing ofMotion Pictures, 12 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 1-18 (1992).
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the film's licensees if they purchased it based upon that cast. The entire
process is a complicated juggling act.
When unexpected labor costs, residuals, and the like arise, such
unanticipated expenses can torpedo an entire production. Residuals are a
particular problem because they are calculated on the basis of gross sales in
most instances, and it is those sales revenues (the presale contract's
guarantees) which are banked to produce the film. Thus, as described more
fully below, the money needed as collateral to acquire a loan to produce the
film is being taxed by the guilds.
Artistic tension arises because key artists know their agreement to
provide services allows the film to be presold and, thus, produced. When
that power is added to the fact most independent productions have no
substantial amount of funding available for unexpected costs, and the
normal demands of artists in this industry, substantial tension is no surprise.
Even when a negative pick-up agreement, joint venture or other
mechanism is utilized to produce a film, most independent films require
completion bonds for the comfort of their distributor or other financier.
Thus, the process for most independents is a complicated one in which art
and commerce are at best precariously balanced.
IV. WHY WE NEED AND WILL CONTINUE To HAVE INDEPENDENT FILM
PRODUCTION
Many supporters of independent production assume its value without
question. Others assume its demise without remorse. Why is independent
film production important?
The disparity of views regarding most motion picture issues arises
from the fact that motion pictures are both art and commerce. 74 Depending
on which element is emphasized, the evaluation of independent film's
purpose changes dramatically. However, independent films need to
flourish for both business and artistic reasons.
We have traditionally assumed-particularly in the United States-
that anyone, anywhere in the world, from any class or background, should
be able to express his or her artistic vision. However, the impact of this
principle is often undesirable to many. For example, the development of
74. The tension between art and commerce is, of course, at the heart of the filmmaking
process. Roger Corman described it as follows, "It's a compromised art form. It's a 50-50 split,
art and commerce. Maybe that's why Americans are good at it. In a time when American
industry is falling behind other countries, the American film industry is by far the most successful
in the world. That's what we're good at-art and commerce, compromised." CoRMAN &
JEROMB, supra note 39, at 237.
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rap music and other black and Latino-oriented artistic endeavors have been
often attacked by critics, politicians, media and "mainstream" artists as
soon as they become successful. Whether the argument is obscenity,
immorality, or sedition, it should not be surprising to anyone that
encouraging expression by young people surrounded by poverty,
discrimination and abuse might sometimes lead to art which expresses the
most extreme versions of their pain.
Results have included the influence of graffiti on modem art; of rock
'n roll and rap on much of world culture; and of "subversive" 1960s films
like Z, Midnight Cowboy,75 The Battle of Algiers,76 and Andy Warhol's
films on artistic and business elements in the motion picture industry. Only
by allowing artists to stretch their (and, sometimes unpleasantly, our) limits
can we establish a society based on awareness, discipline and
responsibility. This is similarly true in the technical field where
experimental films, documentaries, and an assortment of acting, camera,
lighting, editing and other new techniques are developed in independent
films before finding their way into more commercial endeavors. For
example, look at the extraordinary impact of music video techniques in
recent action blockbusters.
Viewing independent film from a business standpoint, independents
can be seen as the "minor leagues" which feed "players" to the "major
leagues" (studios), thus providing substantial stability and value to the
overall industry. Where can film directors learn their craft if not by making
films? Must (or can) all directors of photography, producers, writers,
actors, assistant directors and others who wish to direct a film be allowed to
start with a large studio picture as Jan DeBont did with Speed?.7 Most
directors need substantial experience before they find their place in the
market and reach their full abilities. For every director who can begin with
a great film, hundreds start with smaller efforts where they can make
mistakes with much smaller financial and career consequences.7
Even oft-celebrated "auteurs" like George Lucas, Spike Lee, Quentin
Tarantino, Martin Scorsese, and Steven Spielberg began with student
and/or independent films to learn their craft. While there are many who
75. MIDNIGHT COWBOY (United Artists 1969).
76. THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS (LA BATTAGLUA D)ALGEPJ) (Magna 1965).
77. SPEED (Twentieth Century Fox 1994).
78. Roger Corman alone provided such early experience for directors Francis Ford Coppola,
Peter Bogdanovich, Martin Scorsese, Jonathan Demme, Ron Howard, Joe Dante, John Sayles and
James Cameron, along with Jack Nicholson, Robert Towne, and Dennis Hopper. CORMAN &
JEROME, supra note 39, at vii.
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look at Scorsese's Mean Streets79 or Tarantino's Reservoir Dogs80 as
brilliant films, neither performed well financially during initial release--
and the burden of requiring a superior economic performance could have
lessened those films' impact and perhaps slowed each director's career.
Artists can often regenerate or expand their careers by making
smaller, less controlled films without the commercial burdens which
accompany a studio film."1 For example, look at actors Andie MacDowell
and James Spader in sex, lies and videotape,2 Harvey Keitel in Reservoir
Dogs, 3 Kevin Spacey in The Usual Suspects," John Travolta in Pulp
Fiction85 or, more recently, Ian McKellen in Love & Death on Long
Island,6and Gods and Monsters, 7 and Nick Nolte in Affliction.88
Large film companies are not well-suited to attempt new content, or
technical or marketing approaches, or to renew older film techniques or
stories that have fallen from favor-in other words, to take chances.8 9
Thus, it is not surprising that various genres, such as horror films from A
Nightmare on Elm Streef to Scream,9' made comebacks or found new
methods of reaching their audiences through independently made pictures.
Independents can (because they must) see where audiences exist for certain
kinds of films the studios usually do not and, perhaps cannot, make.
79. MEAN STREETS (Warner Bros. 1973).
80. RESERVOIR DOGS (Miramax 1992).
81. As Sam Arkoff wrote: "New independent companies will find niches to fill that the
majors don't wish to enter. Young actors, writers, and directors who have something new and
original to offer will discover avenues for displaying their talents, too." ARKOFF, supra note 39,
at 252.
82. SEX, LIES AND VIDEOTAPE (Miramax 1989).
83. RESERVOIR DOGS (Miramax 1992).
84. THE USUAL SUSPECTS (Gramercy Pictures 1995).
85. PULP FICTIoN (Miramax 1994).
86. LOVE & DEATH ON LONG ISLAND (Regents Ent. 1998).
87. GODS & MONSTERS (Regents Ent. 1998).
88. AFFLICTION (Kingsgate Prods. 1997).
89. Interestingly, witness this 50 year-old analysis:
Today, the hope of the American film lies not in the heavily supervised output of
the big studios - with their tendency to make pictures which conform to
ingredients for success at the box office culled from inquiries directed at
ascertaining the elements which the majority of the public likes - but in those
independently made pictures .... It makes for individuality.
WOOD, supra note 28 at 344-45. The author commented on independent filmmakers who,
making one to four pictures each year for studio distribution, were free from "the attendant
worries of distribution" to make pictures "with freshness, resource and ideas." Id. But, an
independent's "path is still beset with the one difficulty that has always obstructed independent
production, namely finance." Id. at 345.
90. A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line 1984).
91. SCREAM (Miramax 1996).
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Perhaps even more important, culturally based films from around the
world will always find a place in international cinema. In such films new
talent can be discovered or established talent can work in a new culture or
with different themes than are commonly allowed in studio pictures. No
matter how dominant the studios become, the internationalization of film
will be a continuing process.9
For these and other reasons, independent films have become a major
source of artistic achievement. Academy Award success has been
bestowed on many independently produced films in the last decade,9
including The English Patient,9 Shine,9 Sling Blade,96 Platoon,97 My Left
Foot,98 Babe,9 Leaving Las Vegas,100 Dead Man Walking,
10 1 The Piano,'°2
Pulp Fiction,10 3 The Usual Suspects,' 4 I Postino,0's Howard's End,'06 and
The Crying Game.
0 7
Independent films serve all these purposes; but it is often a nearly
impossible task to get a quality independent picture financed, cast,
developed, produced, marketed and distributed.
V. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM
A. History and Structure of Collective Bargaining in the Film Industry
Independent production most often depends on carefully controlled
budgets. Uncontrollable costs often threaten the filmmaking process.
92. See Howard M. Frumes, Distributing Motion Pictures Around the World The
International Nature oftheFihnl ndustry, 17 WBITrIER L. REv. 285 (1995).
93. Sabine Meyer, Critics Choice: The Year of the Independent, 5 AFMA INDEPENDENT 1,
(1997). Independent films comprised 54 out of the 89 Academy Award nominations in 1997. Id.
94. THE ENGLISH PATIENT (Miramax 1996).
95. SHINE (Fine Line Features 1996).
96. SLING BLADE (Miramax 1996).
97. PLATOON (Hemdale Film Corp. 1986).
98. MY LEFT FOOT (Miramax 1989).
99. BABE (Universal Pictures 1998)..
100. LEAVING LAS VEGAS (United Artists 1995).
101. DEAD MAN WALKING (Gramercy Pictures 1995).
102. THE PIANO (CiBy 2000 1993).
103. PULP FICTION (Miramax 1994).
104. THE USUAL SUSPECTS (Gramercy Pictures 1995).
105. IL POSTINO (Miramax 1994).
106. HOwARD's END (Merchant-Ivory Prods. 1992).
107. THE CRYING GAME (Miramax 1992). Academy Award nominations in 1997 included
54 of 89 nominations to "independent films." Meyer, supra note 93, at 1.
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Union and guild "minimum" requirements have a very different impact on
independent producers than on studio production, where they can be
incorporated into broader cost and overhead analyses. One would thus
assume that industry collective bargaining agreements are negotiated
separately by the studios and the independents-but this is not the case.
Early industry union agreements understandably arose from
unionizing the studios, which continue to negotiate together as a
management group (through the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television
Producers ("AMPTP")). The formation of SAG and the Screen Writers
Guild (the forerunner of the current Writer's Guild of America ('VGA"))
in 1933 were courageous and difficult challenges for studio employees.0'0
However, the entertainment guilds and unions have become strong and
often relentlessly inflexible. Independents who wish to hire union workers
are expected to acquiesce to studio negotiated terms. Neither the studios
nor these unions have had any incentive to change this mutually beneficial
system. The studios and guilds have reached a balance in bargaining power
and have learned to work together to meet many of their respective
needs.' (9 However, independents have had little, if any, say in the
industry's current union agreements.
Forty years ago, in a University of California-Berkeley study,
Collective Bargaining In The Motion Picture Industry,"° the authors
pointed out that the International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees
("IATSE"), which represents most film crew employees, negotiates a basic
agreement with the major producers which sets up a collective bargaining
unit, "provides [for] recognition of the union, and stipulates the basic
obligations between the parties to negotiate the specific local union
agreements."' " They also observed that the key negotiations of issues with
the Screen Writer's Guild, now the WGA, are those with the major
producers, for the terms of the agreement arrived at here are ordinarily
accepted by the independents."'" 2 This overstates the choice-all studio
terms must be accepted by independents or they are not allowed to work
with WGA members. Just one example: an independent company which
asks to become a signatory must accept all WGA rules retroactively to the
beginning of the then-current collective bargaining agreement, even though
108. Jan Wilson, SpecialEffects ofUnions inHollywoo, 12 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 403, 408-
11(1992).
109. Id. at 434.
110. HUGH LOVELL & TASILE CARTER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE MOTION
PICTURE INDUSTRY: A STRUGGLE FOR STABILITY 26 (1955).
111. Id.
112. Id. at39.
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the independent producer may have had no knowledge whatsoever of the
applicable rules during that earlier period and no money budgeted for any
retroactive assessments the WGA may later decide to require. In such
ways, the WGA exercises its power arbitrarily in a manner befitting famous
studio moguls like Sam Cohn of Columbia and Louis B. Mayer of MGM.
The diverse needs of different employees are resolved by a variety of
unions and guilds. The similarly diverse needs of independent producers
are almost always overlooked, leaving independents without the flexibility
needed to meet the requirements of independent films.
B. The Collective Bargaining Agreements
At present, the collective bargaining agreements independent film
producers primarily need to address are those with the Directors Guild of
America ("DGA") (directors), WGA (writers), SAG (actors) and IATSE
(crew). Most pictures, including small independent films, utilize the
Teamsters for transportation personnel.
The first step in evaluating which collective bargaining agreements to
accept is to determine where a production is to be organized and produced
(including its pre-production, production and post-production). Some
states remain particularly invulnerable to union organizing. A motion
picture being fully organized and produced outside the United States, while
potentially subject to local union requirements, can often proceed outside
of the scope of these U.S. film industry collective bargaining agreements.
Independent film producers face substantial problems with the DGA,
WGA and SAG as a result of rules prepared for and by the studios that are
often applied harshly to independents. These include personal guarantees,
security agreements, priority security interests ahead of distributors (even
when those distributors are essentially financiers), and questions about
whether a guild or union even will accept a production entity as a guild
signatory. These problems will be discussed further below. The decision
about whether a production will be subject to applicable unions is
increasingly taken out of the hands of production companies. In any event,
this decision has a substantial impact on the budget, available talent,
locations, production schedules, and eventually upon potential profits for
the independent producer.
C. Use of Non-Unionized Labor in Independent Production
Independent film companies arguably can use non-union personnel.
However, doing so can undermine a film's completion or quality while
succumbing to the unions can destroy a picture's budget. Initially, a
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producer must determine whether non-union crew members are available
and if they can work professionally, on schedule and on budget. While
many countries have such skilled personnel, cultural or language issues
may stretch schedules, ruin budgets or make necessary communication all
but impossible. Furthermore, proven actors are almost always SAG
members. Making a film without recognizable actors can destroy its
desirability for distributors and exhibitors and undermine its ability to be
financed.
Even if a production proceeds in whole or in part on a non-union
basis, union organizing activities (including picketing or more subtle forms
of harassment) may throw a delicate schedule or tight budget off course.
Suddenly, an independently financed production can face unbudgeted costs
beyond its financial wherewithal." t3 While one might expect unions to
compromise in such instances in order to sign up new companies and allow
films to be made, this is often not the case. Their power is often exercised
as a means to frighten other independent companies or to win membership
approval (or elections) no matter the dire consequences to small producers
trying to realize their artistic dreams or build their production skills.
The question of whether to utilize union talent often is an essential
one and should be dealt with early and knowingly by any independent
producer.
VI. BIAS AGAINST INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS IN THE GUILD
AGREEMENTS
The producers' voice for industry collective bargaining is the
AMPTP, which consists of the studios and networks. Independents have
no voice and certainly no influence over this bargaining entity."'
Independent companies can choose to either sign with the entertainment
113. Although many independents are sympathetic with the idea of unions, IATSE
requirements are seen as:
[A]t best a throwback to an earlier era, at worst a coarse blockade to their style of
filmmaking. Stretching tight budgets to accommodate the cost of pension and
welfare benefits is one concern, but so are union regulations - crew size, the
number of hours and days of work, who is permitted to do what tasks. It goes
against the grain, they say, of the family-style work ethic indie helmers strive for.
Dan Cox, IA Amends Local Wage Provision, DAILY VARIETY, July 19, 1995, at 16. However, in
1996 the IATSE did agree on a low-budget agreement with certain independent filmmakers which
reportedly has caused 95 percent (as opposed to 55 percent only a few years ago) of films
budgeted over three million dollars and shot in Los Angeles to be done under IATSE auspices.
Dan Margolis, Union, Indies Work Through Uneasy Peace, VARIETY, Sept. 1-7, 1997, at 7,15.
114. See Alan Paul & Archie Kleingartner, Flexible Production and the Transformation of
Industrial Relations in the Motion Picture Industry, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 663, 666
(1994).
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unions and guilds or not. With some exceptions for extremely low-budget
pictures, and a few recent discussions with some of the unions,
independents have not been able to negotiate directly with the guilds or
unions in any meaningful fashion. Neither the studios nor the guilds have
seen any reason to include the independent voice in any negotiations of
substance.
Studio control of this collective bargaining process results in many
terms being accepted which are reasonable for a studio making many
pictures each year and also expending huge annual amounts for prints,
advertising, overhead and distribution costs; however, smaller, independent
companies (many of which are formed to make a single picture) often find
such collective bargaining requirements a substantial hindrance to even
getting films made. Moreover, such rules greatly reduce the likelihood that
completed independent films will become sufficiently profitable to
encourage future films to be independently financed and produced.
A. Residuals as a Tax
This concern is best exemplified by the residual payments required
under the industry's existing collective bargaining agreements. Residuals
are a means for individuals who work on motion pictures to share in the
profits reaped by the producer. However, the way in which residuals are
structured essentially works as a tax on production for independent
filmmakers who do not own their own distribution entities.
Most residuals are payable from gross revenues derived from a film's
exploitation in certain markets (video, cable, etc.)."1 The theory accepted
by the studios was that this would be a simple method of calculating a
seemingly small percentage of a film's revenues earmarked to pay those
artists who otherwise might not be able to negotiate individually for a
reasonable participation in a film's true profits. Such a system arose
115. Residuals are calculated as a set payment per television run or a percentage of gross
receipts. For example, SAG negotiated minimum compensation for its actors in television motion
pictures for one domestic telecast. Any subsequent run requires an additional payment of 100
percent of the total compensation for each network prime time telecast, with a ceiling (through
July 1, 1997) of $3,100 for one hour and $3,472 for two hours. A lesser amount is payable for
network non-prime time runs, syndication, and other telecasts. Additional payments are required
for international telecasts. For a theatrical motion picture, the producer is required to pay 3.6
percent of gross receipts from free or pay television, 4.5 percent of the first million dollars, and
5.4 percent thereafter for home video gross receipts. There are also residual payments required
for pay television and basic cable releases. Residuals are also payable to WGA, DGA and IATSE
members, requiring additional calculations, reports and payments. The total payments due on
residuals for all these guilds can be an amazingly large and indeterminate assessment for an
independent producer struggling to raise production money by licensing a picture's distribution
rights.
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because of the studios' historic reluctance (to say the least) to negotiate fair
"back-end" agreements, and their decision to define and account for "net
profits" in order to make such proceeds available at best to only an elite
group of actors, directors and writers.
Residuals were acceptable for the studios since, among other reasons,
they can simply incorporate such costs into their budgetary calculations for
each year and each picture, and adjust other business agreements and
obligations accordingly. An independent producer is in a very different
situation.1
16
Many independent pictures are produced by companies which obtain
loans secured by future contractual streams of income from pre-sales of
distribution rights for an unfinished picture. These pre-sales are "taxed" by
the obligation to pay residuals on them, thus directly reducing the amount
of money available to the independent producer to actually produce the
picture. In the independent filmmaking world, residuals actually make it
less possible to produce pictures and less probable that independent
companies will be able to make better and more successful pictures, and
thus less likely to make or share profits with participants. Ultimately, this
structure taxes independent filmmakers and helps keep the current
centralized studio system tightly locked in place.
B. Minimum Payments and Rigid Rules
Collective bargaining agreements set minimum guaranteed salaries,
benefits, work rules, required personnel, and conditions. These have been
accepted by the studios which incorporate such costs into their overall
budgets. While the studios regularly battle the unions over such
requirements, it is a fight over dividing profits rather than a question of
survival. For smaller filmmakers, these minimum requirements make
many films unfinanceable or remove qualitative elements from the screen
in order to pay for unneeded personnel or to incorporate rules inappropriate
for small, cooperative artistic endeavors.
116. Monica Roman, Guilds Team in Resids Battle, VARIETY, Feb. 2-8, 1998, at 5, 11
("[lindependent producers are developing new financing methods that do not readily fit into a
framework of rules written largely with the studios in mind.").
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C. Security Interests, Escrow Accounts, Guarantees and
Other Financial Obstacles
The guilds have taken the position in recent years that they have the
right to insist upon any and every financial penalty and security 117 they can
develop to attempt to protect themselves from unpaid residuals, benefits
and compensation. While protecting members' compensation is an
understandable goal when dealing with a small production company, the
guilds do not negotiate financial protection for their members' benefits and
residuals; instead, they simply insist that before an independent production
company can become a signatory or hire any guild members, it must do
whatever the guilds demand. Because the studios are capable of making
required payments, it is the independents which pay the price of such
demands, although the negotiations in which such requirements are set are
only between the studios and guilds. Thus, independents are again
burdened by matters the studios find perfectly reasonable.
Rather than seeing independent production as a sometimes risky but
eminently important part of the business, the guilds will halt production
and undermine films in order to protect potential losses. This overreaction
to the bankruptcies and failures of independent companies in the 1980s is
understandable in purpose, but not in method. The requirement that
payment of future residuals be secured ahead of film distributors, who are
essentially investors in most independent projects, often makes it
impossible to close appropriate financial deals with those distributors.
Such security interests often interfere with a producer's ability to borrow
money from a bank based on a picture's pre-sales. Therefore, many
pictures must be made outside of the guild and union system, which only
angers those guilds and unions further, as they cannot understand why
anyone would want to make small films without them-despite the
obstacles they place in the way of independent producers.
The budgets for even small motion pictures are expensive when
compared to a capital investment in a start-up company. For example, a
five million dollar film may be minuscule in the motion picture industry,
but a new business capitalized in that amount is often perceived very
differently. Therefore, when unions and guilds demand that investors
provide stringent security agreements and personal guarantees, collateralize
future benefits and residuals, and/or escrow large sums of money, it can
117. See Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver, 116
B.R. 194, 197-98 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990). A security interest in copyrightable intellectual
property is obtained by filing a mortgage of copyright with the U.S. Copyright office. Id. at 198-
99.
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become virtually impossible for some films to generate enough funds to be
produced. At minimum, this causes available money not to appear on the
screen. With finance charges, interest, completion bond premiums,
residuals, pension, health and welfare payments, escrow costs, legal fees,
finder's fees and similar expenses, independent producers often find their
small budgets shrinking away to amounts which can greatly reduce the
artistic, and thus the commercial, potential for their film." 8 The increased
use of gap financing and insurance-backed loans has made this problem
even greater for independent producers.
The guilds might reasonably look at such projects as additional
employment opportunities subject to a certain amount of financial risk.
They could advise their members that such a film includes risks if they
agree to be involved. Their members could then be allowed to decide for
themselves whether to insist on partial escrows, to waive residuals, to take
the risk of future non-payment, or to otherwise structure an unusual deal, in
exchange for being involved in artistically challenging and exciting
projects. However, artists are not allowed to make these kinds of decisions
because the guilds believe they know what is appropriate in all cases. The
guilds look to their institutional, short term benefit rather than the
industry's-and their members'-long term health. While such an
approach may be quite reasonable when dealing with the studios, the guilds
have far more bargaining power than independent production companies
and have no need for such strict, unbending requirements on all
independent films, particularly those with lower budgets.
D. Creative Rights
A special collective bargaining committee exists to negotiate creative
rights under the DGA Basic Agreement. No independent company is
represented in that process. This is endemic to the problem of so-called
"creative" rights in the film industry." 9
118. Some of these expenses include interest, completion bond premiums, residuals,
pension, health and welfare payments, escrow costs, legal fees, finder's fees, and similar
expenses. Also, the increased use of gap financing exacerbates the problems independent
producers face.
119. The DGA's 1996 Creative Rights Handbook contains an introductory letter to DGA
members which includes the following: "During the 1996 negotiations, our committee met for
several months with studio CEOs as well as network executives, grappling with many issues
which confront directors in our work .... This Code is a set of guidelines that the studios and
networks have agreed is the way the directing process ought to work." DIRECTOR'S GUILD OF
AMERICA, Introduction to 1996 CREATIVE RIGHTS HANDBOOK (1996). How broad are these
rights? In the DGA Handbook's opening "checklist," the following appears in bold print, "At all
times were you consulted about every creative decision?" Id (emphasis in original
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Questions of how much time a director must have to cut a film, the
amount of involvement a producer or writer may have in post-production,
the ability to replace a director on a film during (or after) principal
photography, and other issues have been negotiated over the years by the
studios and guilds. These and many other issues-like recent efforts to
reduce producer credits-often find the guilds and studios in agreement as
to underlying goals. However, independent production companies, which
must raise money for each picture, utilize everything, including credits, as a
means of doing so. With time and money usually of equivalent importance
for the independent producer, their available approaches to creative rights
determinations are far more limited than the studios.
If a studio errs in one area in order to solve another problem (for
example, if it overrides creative rights to expedite delivery of a picture for
exhibition), it can either persuade the guild member not to raise the issue at
all in order to work with that studio in the future, or it can afford to settle
the claim by paying damages. An independent production company can
usually do neither. There are many creative rights issues which need to be
determined very differently for smaller pictures, but independent producers
are not even given a voice in negotiations about these topics.
E. Dispute Resolution with the Guilds
A myriad of issues arise under the collective bargaining agreements
with the DGA, WGA and SAG. Each agreement includes its own
provisions for handing grievances and, in most cases, pursuing them
through arbitration.1 20 Arbitrators are approved for each new agreement by
the guilds and studios. If those arbitrators rule in a manner outside the
acceptable norm, either powerful side can eliminate them during the next
round of negotiations. No matter how objective these individuals are, an
arbitrator's risk is quite different when ruling against a studio than ruling
against an independent producer.
120. For example, the WGA Basic Agreement of 1995 includes two detailed sections on
grievances and arbitration (Articles 10 and 11) and even lengthier rules regarding credits and
credit arbitration. 1995 W'rrER's GUILD OF AMERICA - ALLIANCE OF MOTION PICTURE &
TELEVISION PRODUCERS THEATRICAL AND TELEVISION BASIC AGREEMENT art.10, 11 (AMPTP
ed., 1995). The DGA Basic Agreement has set forth its rules regarding disputes, grievances and
arbitration in its Article 2. ALLIANCE OF MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION PRODUCERS AND
DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA, INC. BASIC AGREEMENT OF 1993 art. 2 (AMPTP ed., 1993).
The Screen Actors Guild Basic Agreement also sets forth grievance and arbitration procedures,
and each of these guilds has negotiated arbitration procedures with licensed talent agents to cover
disputes between guild members and their agents. PRODUCER-SCREEN ACTORS GUILD CODIFIED
BASIC AOREEMENT OF 1995 (AMPTP ed. 1995).
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The most obvious influencing factor in resolving disputes with the
guilds is the cost of doing so. In any situation where resolving a dispute
will cost one party substantially more than the other, the nature of the
negotiation and resolution is greatly influenced. In this case, there are two
factors helpful to guild members which are harmful to independent
producers. First, the guilds provide legal representation for their members
in any such disputes without cost. Most independent producers have no in-
house attorneys (or, if they do, no one trained or available for litigation)
and no budget for litigation costs. This is particularly true when a company
has raised money to produce one or two films and budgeted the cost of
production carefully. Knowing this, the guilds can pursue new and
unsupported theories or even attempt to stretch the meaning of language in
their basic agreements. They have nothing to lose, while the independent
production company is greatly threatened by the whole process.
The second factor of this problem is that no independent production
company is likely to convince an outside lawyer to pursue an expensive
claim against an actor, writer or director with little, if any, legal basis to do
so. However, if a guild member takes such a position, the guild usually
gives that member every consideration in order to avoid a claim against the
guild for unfair representation. Such a claim can hurt the guild's reputation
or be used in inter-organizational political maneuvering. As a result, the
unsupported word of a guild member can suffice for the guild to pursue an
expensive claim against a production company.
If the proposed respondent is a studio, the guild might be able to
convince its member that the studio will hire expensive and effective
counsel-and also that the guild member will develop a reputation of being
litigious and difficult. When an independent company is the target, these
arguments are less persuasive and less likely to convince a guild member
(or the guild itself) to refrain from pursuing a claim. Thus, the means of
resolving disputes can prove biased against independent producers.
VII. THE MPAA TITLE REGISTRATION BUREAU AND RATINGS BOARD
ARE OFTEN INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF INDEPENDENT
PRODUCERS
Independents also face problems arising from the studios' trade
association, the MPAA. While the studios' positions and strength in
Congress often assists the entire industry, there are MPAA activities which
create concerns for independents, particularly in titling and rating their
films.
INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION IN FILM INDUSTRY
A. The APAA Title Registration Bureau as a Closed System
The MPAA set up a Title Registration Bureau ("Bureau") which was
later opened to any producers who pay the necessary fees and agree to
abide by that organization's rules. There is nothing in the Bureau's rules
which expressly reflects prejudice toward independent production
companies. The rules apply equally to everyone who joins. In essence,
this is a voluntary contractual structure where everyone who wants to be on
the same footing with Warner Bros., Universal or Disney can do so to
protect their film titles and have a means to enforce that protection. 
' 2
Unfortunately, this system sometimes creates results different for
independents than for studios. If an independent cannot afford to join the
Bureau, it cannot protect its title in advance. Once an independent film is
financed and completed, it can use its title in most instances, if it can obtain
distribution outside of the Bureau's membership. However, if the
independent producer has the good fortune of licensing its film to a studio
or an independent distributor which is a Bureau member, that distributor's
acquisition of the picture requires it to then register the title. If the
attempted registration is protested, the distributor must arbitrate or change
the title and register a new one. If a different studio has previously
registered the title-or anything close to it-even if it has not produced a
film with that title, a protest can and usually will be filed. The previous
registrant holds a significant advantage over the independent producer,
even if the independent film has been completed. Thus, by not registering
earlier, the independent filmmaker suddenly may not be able to use a title it
has already invested in, although it otherwise could have used the title
freely under the law.
Studio members submit most of their titles to be registered,
apparently accounting for around eighty percent of registrations; and thus
have developed an interesting practical system. Essentially, they protest
titles where they have any arguable basis-no matter how tenuous-to do
so. Any overlap or similarity of a single word usually generates a protest
even if the title will cause no confusion.
The studios, armed with thousands of titles and hundreds of protests,
essentially barter with one another over titles, one for another, one favor for
121. Titles are not protected under the United States Copyright Act, although they can
sometimes be protected under common law unfair competition principles and the federal Lanham
Act 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(a) (West 19981 if the title has developed "secondary meaning" with the
public. See Dennis Angel, Legal Protection for Titles in the Entertairnent Industry, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 279 (1979).
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another, privately working out their differences in most cases.' 22 An
independent producer who has joined the Bureau and registered one title
(or even a few titles) has nothing to barter with and has to rely upon the
grace and kindness of a studio or proceed with the arbitration process set
forth in the Bureau's rules. To do so can delay release of a picture or, at
minimum, undermine that independent's ability to work with the
challenged studio on subsequent films.
In the event of a title dispute, an arbitration procedure can be utilized.
While the arbitrators undoubtedly have a certain level of objectivity and
skill which they bring to bear on such proceedings, they understand the
film business from the perspective of the studio (their employer), not the
independent.
The Bureau was not set up to create difficulties for independent
producers. The Bureau's purpose was undoubtedly to avoid unnecessary
title disputes and litigation between the studios. Opening this process to
independent producers which are not otherwise members of the MPAA can
be seen as a generous act. The Bureau has sufficient power, given the
number of films developed and produced by MPAA members alone, that
no alternate structure is likely to gain credibility.
Independents can choose to leave themselves open to title problems,
unable to protect their titles even as they invest substantial sums into an
independent production, or run the risk of ending up with a Bureau
distributor and a protest which forces a late title change and economic or
artistic harm. Alternatively, they can join the Bureau and fight the same
difficult odds they face elsewhere in the film industry.
One could argue that the title registration system is only a symptom of
the problems for independents. In any event, like the MPAA ratings board
discussed below, the Bureau seems to enhance studio dominance.
B. The MPAA Ratings Board as a Studio-Run Censor
The MPAA Classification and Ratings Association is the modem
version of the censorship structure imposed upon Hollywood by its own
leaders in the 1920s to offset public criticism about the subject matter of
122. The Bureau has privately estimated that approximately 4,200 titles were registered in
1995 with approximately 4,500 resulting protests. In 1996, it appears that around 4,400 titles
were registered with close to perhaps 9,000 protests. At the cost of $30 for each protest, this is a
cheap way for the studios to protect their huge marketing costs on each picture, to make sure no
other studio releases a film with a similar title. The result of all this bartering is that virtually
none of these protests result in arbitration. In fact, of the almost 9,000 protests in 1996, only four
ended in an arbitration hearing.
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their films.' 23 The current ratings system was formed as part of the MPAA
effort to increase the studios' political influence and market dominance,
and to alleviate pressure from citizen groups.'" The studios wanted to
prove that they still could police themselves, without governmental or
judicial interference. To justify the MPAA ratings system, MPAA
President Jack Valenti has cited U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which
allow local and state governments to determine what is obscene as a far
more draconian alternative, and public opinion polls apparently have
shown substantial support by parents of minors.'25
Originally, it was argued that these ratings would not affect anyone's
ability to make films about difficult subjects. The X rating was not
intended to keep people from seeing films but, rather, to allow them to
decide which films contained inappropriate subject matter and should be
avoided (particularly by children). In fact, an X rating did not keep
Midnight Cowboy12 from being advertised, theatrically distributed and
winning the 1969 Best Picture Academy Award. However, over time, the
X rating became identified with pornography as that industry used it to
promote itself. Newspapers decided not to advertise X-rated programs. At
present, Blockbuster and other video retailers will not even stock NC-17
product. Therefore, the ratings board unintentionally became the arbiter of
what the public could or could not see and the ratings system became a
censorship mechanism.1
27
Ignoring First Amendment issues, some might applaud such a step.
However, that applause, even under the best of circumstances, is only
appropriate when ratings are based on objective and clear standards to
reflect what constitutes acceptable material (i.e., G, PG, PG-13, or R) and
what does not (i.e., X and now NC-17 rated material). With studios
123. FRImDRCH, supra note 17, at 84. When religious and other groups complained about
the subject matter of 1920s films, the studios hired Republican Postmaster Will Hays to preside
over the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America and become Hollywood's censor.
Id. In 1941, the so-called "Hays Office" (the Production Code Administration) was augmented
with the Bureau Of Motion Pictures in the Office of War Information, which was to review film
scripts to see if they were in the national interest. Id. Hays was replaced in 1945 by Eric
Johnston, former President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, who, among other things
oversaw creation of the blacklists. Id. at 235.
124. Recent political attacks on the content of film and television production are not a new
problem. See JOWETT, FILM: THE DEMOCRATIC ART, supra note 29, at 308-09 (discussing the
Hays office and other issues related to film content).
125. Richard Mosk, Motion Picture Ratings in the United States, 15 CARDOzo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 135, 142 (1997).
126. MIDNiGHT CowBoY (United Artists 1969).
127. While the MPAA ratings system includes an appeals board, over two-thirds of appeals
during the board's first 25 years were denied, according to MPAA President Jack Valenti. Ray
Benne, Scissors Unhappy, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 20, 1996, at 96.
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dominating the MPAA and domestic film distribution, and advertisers and
large video retailers being keenly aware of every concern about overtly
sexual or violent product, this rating system effectively can result in films
being banned.
How does such censorship occur if the studios are rating their own
films solely for informational purposes? Virtually all studio films can and
do obtain at least R ratings, although some directors like Oliver Stone have
been forced to edit their films substantially. Independent films have
serious problems with the ratings board far more often. Admittedly, this is
sometimes because independent filmmakers are not aware of the ratings
board's standards or because some independents attempt to produce
something new and different and, therefore, frightening to the ratings board
(and maybe even the public). The MPAA, beholden to its ultimate studio
owners and desirous of maintaining its power, may react differently to
independent pictures.
The board contends that it is not biased. Battles in recent years
between the ratings board and formerly independent distributor Miramax
(now a wholly owned Disney subsidiary) have sometimes taken on the
appearance of Miramax marketing campaigns, rather than disputes over
free speech or the availability of pictures for the public. It is also true that
some filmmakers want to push the limits beyond what almost anyone else
thinks the public should be allowed (or would want) to see and, in those
cases, ego, indulgence and excess can be the true subject of ratings
disputes. Nevertheless, those films which create serious difficulties for the
ratings board are almost always independently produced. Examples
include Miramax's Kids 128 and Priest,29 and Spanish director Pedro
Almodovar's Tie Me Up, Tie Me Down.130  Surprisingly, however,
Propaganda's Jason's Lyric'3' also had to be cut to reach an "R" rating, to
the consternation of its director.1
32
Inherent in such decisions are prejudices against subject matters
which, while not in and of themselves pornographic, obscene or overly
violent, are subjects with which the studios and mainstream consumers may
not be familiar. Such subjects can include gay themes, minority vernacular
or language, or sexual themes approached from the perspective of an
international filmmaker from a country where sexual norms are different
than in America. These subjects may include concerns about what children
128. KIDS (Miramax 1995).
129. PRIEST (Miramax 1995).
130. TIE ME Up, TIE ME DowN (Laurenfilm 1990).
131. JASON'S LYRIc (Propaganda Films 1994).
132. Bennett, supra note 127, at 48.
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should see (alcohol, cigarettes, violence), use of drugs, or language.
133
While the audience should certainly know the kind of picture about to be
seen, is it appropriate for the ratings board to be able to practically ensure
that some films cannot be seen at all?
There is no independent rating board. The MPAA answers to the
studios. There is thus no clear prospect for change other than a moral
appeal to the ratings board's leadership and continued tinkering with the
available ratings. In the latter instance, the change from the X to the NC-
17 rating did not have any major impact on what could be advertised,
telecast, exhibited or distributed. The new television ratings system (for
the so-called "V" chip) may or may not make the problem worse, but the
MPAA's leadership position in creating this new television ratings system
assures one thing: no real voice for independent filmmakers.
Virtually every studio agreement concerning acquiring, directing,
producing and financing films requires delivery of a picture which can
receive an MPAA rating no more restrictive than R. Thus, this insipid form
of censorship continues, maintaining studio strength in film distribution
and keeping unusual or challenging, but often artistically valuable,
independent films from obtaining the kind of release they deserve and
might obtain in another country or another time.
VIII. THE DISORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS
A. Size, Nature and Number of Companies
Many independent film companies are, in reality, one or two
filmmakers with limited resources. While there continue to be some highly
professional production entities separate from the studios, they are
becoming increasingly reliant on studio financing and distribution. There
are also a number of "independent" companies which are tied fully or
primarily to the studios for some combination of talent, production capital,
or distribution, exhibition or marketing.
133. Varying attitudes about sex and violence can cause certain films to be targeted by
politicians, critics and media. This has happened with Natural Born Killers, Kids, and Crash.
Religious subjects can also create substantial controversy, as with Priest and The Last Temptation
Of Christ. Such controversy sometimes can be helpfiul commercially if a distributor stands up to
it or takes advantage of the increased awareness of the film. According to former Landmark
Theaters senior Vice President Bert Manzari, "It's a particular asset for a specialized movie,
because it allows it to rise above the noise of all the other things in the marketplace." Leonard
Klady, Sweet Controversy: 'Crash,' 'KIllers' Cash in on Public Brouhaha, DAILY VARiETY, Jan.
2, 1997 at 6.
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Studio economics and constraints seep into films made independently
when the studio is its ultimate distributor. Even if the studio does not pay
to produce a film, its huge outlay for print and advertising costs results in
contractual and actual control over script, cast, schedule, budget, and
numerous other elements.
To the extent independent film companies exist, they have been too
numerous, small, disorganized and, of course, independent to organize and
negotiate effectively with the unions, alter MPAA policies, or develop
techniques to offset studio dominance.
B. AFMA and Independent Producers Association
It should not be terribly surprising that the studios have been able to
maintain their power and to cooperate with one another, mostly through the
MPAA, to structure the film industry to their liking. Meanwhile
independent producers and distributors have remained on the outside
looking in.
By the nature of being independent of the studios, most independent
production companies work on very few films-often only one. When a
film is completed, the principals move to other productions, in other
combinations, and there is no overall business strategy developed except on
a project-by-project basis. Even where smaller independent companies are
formed to produce films, their struggle for ongoing capital, distribution and
access to material and talent is such that they can hardly expend much in
the way of additional time and resources to try to alter (or sometimes even
understand) the industry's structure, no matter how troublesome it may be.
This may be changing somewhat. Starting with distributors, where
even independent companies tend to have some ongoing income flow, the
American Film Marketing Association (now simply "AFMA") was formed
in 1980 by a handful of independent film distribution veterans who licensed
English-language motion pictures around the world.' 34 This entity had
grown by 1999 to over 130 distributors based in Los Angeles, New York,
London, and elsewhere, with membership also available to lending
institutions and television distribution companies.1
35
134. Member companies "generally do not maintain overseas sales organizations; rather
they license country by country and medium by medium to. local or national distributors or sub-
licensees." JONAS ROSENFIELD, AMERICAN FILM MARKETING ASSOCIATION, OVERVmW OF
FOREIGN MARKETS 2 (1989).
135. AFMA's survey of its members' sales for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1998
reflected total sales worldwide, excluding U.S. sales, of S2,283,315,000. American Film
Marketing Association Statistical Survey (1998). The June 30, 1996 total sales were
$1,656,000,000, an increase of well over a quarter billion dollars from the prior fiscal year. The
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AFMA's purpose is to represent independent companies involved in
the international distribution of English-language films. In doing so, its
members' dues have allowed the association to grow into an entity large
enough to prepare standard form agreements, introduce an effective
arbitration structure, and organize and disburse information regarding
piracy, overseas markets, reliability of film buyers, and similar matters.
AFMA also works for the independent film industry in Washington, D.C.
and with the European Union on various goals and problems (for example,
quotas, copyright issues and piracy), and holds the largest independent film
market in the world in Santa Monica, California, every spring. As such,
AFMA, despite some members' concerns about spending AFMA resources
on such industry-wide efforts, has become an important influence on
certain issues.
AFMA also supported the formation of the Independent Producers
Association in 1996, which was intended as an organization for
independent producers (including many AFMA member distribution
companies which also produce their own films).'3 This organization
hoped to negotiate meaningful changes with the relevant unions and guilds
and otherwise work for independent producers on issues like those
identified in this article. At this early stage, the IPA has been organizing
quietly, and has begun guild negotiations. The jury is out as to whether
sufficient funding, support, effort and patience will be available for this
very much needed organization.
C. Other Significant Organizations for Independents
There are other organizations that assist or encourage independent
filmmakers. The Independent Feature Project is one such entity. A bi-
coastal group originally founded by underfunded independent filmmakers,
IFP organizes meetings, seminars, screenings, a film market and, perhaps
most well-known, the annual Independent Spirit Awards to recognize
achievement in independent films. Even the Cannes Film Festival, 137 while
emphasizing non-U.S. films, exposes many independent films to the
world.13  Examples include sex, lies and videotape139 (after a notable
prior year's reported worldwide sales had been $1.3 billion. American Film Marketing
Association Statistical Survey (1996).
136. Ted Johnson, AFMA Creates New Indle Producers Ar, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 15,
1996, at 8, 22.
137. CARl BEAucHP & HENRI BEHAR, HOLLYWOOD ON THE RIVERA: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE CANNES FILM FESTIVAL 21 (1992).
138. Id.
139. SEX, LIES AND VIDEOTAPE (Miramax 1989).
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Sundance Film Festival ("Sundance") debut), Wild at Heart,4 and Truth
or Dare14 1 (the Madonna documentary). 42 Cannes has also heightened the
world's awareness of films from great international directors like Mike
Leigh 43 (Naked and Secrets & Lies), Jane Campion' 44 (The Piano), Zhang
Yimou' 45 (To Live), Shekhar Kapur'4 (The Bandit Queen), Lars von Trier
(Breaking the Waves 4 ), and many others.
Sundance also includes substantial educational and organizational
programs to accompany its increasingly business-oriented festival.'
4
Sundance has increased the world's awareness and appreciation of
independent films. Success there sometimes leads to little (for example,
Chameleon Street49), and sometimes leads to national acclaim and
distribution (Reservoir Dogs5" and The Brothers McMullen'5'). In 1996
alone, Sundance was the forum for Shine,152 Big Night,15 3 and The Spiore
Grill. 154 Many directors and actors have seen their careers jumpstarted by
acclaim at Sundance (including Allison Anders, Brad Pitt, Ashley Judd,
Quentin Tarantino, Kevin Smith, Ed Bums, Bryan Singer, and David 0.
Russell).
Other film festivals-in Toronto, Venice, Berlin and elsewhere-have
proven records of supporting international and independent filmmakers.
As Sundance has grown, another well-established Rocky Mountain film
festival, in Telluride, Colorado, has become a favorite of many
independents. Started in 1974, Telluride has become successful without
quite the commercial (and studio) pressures of Sundance. Recent domestic
140. WILD AT HEART (PolyGram Film Entertainment 1990).
141. TRUTH OR DARE (Miramax 1991).
142. See BEAUCHAMP & BEHAR, supra note 137, at 21.
143. NAKED (Fine Line 1993) and SECRETS & LIEs (October Films 1996).
144. THE PIANO (Miramax 1993).
145. To LIVE (Shanghi Film Studio 1994).
146. THE BANDIT QUEEN (Kaleidoscope 1994).
147. BREAKING THE WAVES (October Films 1996).
148. Dan Cox, Stone, Sayles Pix Ride High at Telluride, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 26, 1997, at
1, 19.
149. CHAMELEON STREET (Fine Line 1996).
150. RESERVOIR DOGS (Miramax 1991).
151. BROTHERS MCMULLEN (Videography 1995).
152. SHINE (Fine Line 1996).
153. BIG NIGHT (Samuel Goldwyn 1996).
154. THE SPITFIRE GRILL (Castle Rock 1996).
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premieres at Telluride have included Sling Blade,'55 Swingers,156 Breaking
The Waves,'" The Piano,'5
8 The Crying Game, 5 9 and Secrets & Lies.'
60
The American Film Institute ("AFI") and numerous film schools also
provide training, education, and interaction between many in the
independent film business. AFI is also very involved in the history and
preservation of film, which tends to lead to an appreciation of the creativity
of independent films.
These and other organizations help foster independent production but,
ultimately, can do only a limited amount to assist in the ultimate problem
of financing and marketing independent films.
IX. THE BENEFiTS OF FORMING A NEW BARGAINING UNIT FOR
INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS
The problems caused independent producers by residuals, minimum
guaranteed compensation, work rules, and other strict requirements and
mandated personnel must be approached in a completely fresh manner by
independent producers and industry guilds and unions. As long as such
negotiations are separate from the studios, they need not impact existing
rules covering the majority of money spent on film production.
Such negotiations should be focused not on the "independence" of the
producers, but on the limited size of their pictures' budgets. For now,
negotiated rules for three budget levels (e.g., three million dollars, five
million dollars, and ten million dollars) would be a useful and practical
approach. For these purposes, the "budget" must be defined to include
costs inherent in independent films, but not prevalent in studio pictures-
completion bond premiums, finance charges and interest, contingencies,
single picture errors & omissions insurance, escrow fees, finder's fees,
legal fees, gap financing and related insurance costs, and guaranteed
deferments.
Cooperation between negotiators could lead to bonus and deferment
provisions for successful films, elimination of inflexible gross revenue-
based residuals, inclusion of a pre-negotiated true "profit" calculation,
altered provisions for personnel hired for multiple guaranteed films, and
acceptance of a certain amount of "speculative" or contingent work so all
155. SLING BLADE (Miramax 1996).
156. SWINGERS (Miramax 1996).
157. BREAKING THE WAVES (October Films 1996).
158. THE PIANo (Miramax 1993).
159. THE CRYING GAME (Miramax 1992).
160. SECRETS AND LIES (October Films 1996); Cox, supra note 148, at 1, 19.
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major participants are financial, if not legal, partners in the highly
cooperative and collaborative independent filmmaking process.
Directors need to understand how little time and money is often
available in post-production for experiments and freedom when a film must
be delivered to a film market, festival, or distributor to pay off a loan or
free money to pay for ongoing post-production. Writers must be allowed to
write without financial guarantees in the hope that their product will excite
actors, entice investors, and interest distributors. They should share in that
success, but not negotiate provisions which impair its likelihood.
Crew negotiations must be flexible. Safety and health cannot be
compromised, but precedent and power must be. Unions should be open to
all talented personnel. This would allow merit and the market to determine
the staffing of independent films and thus enhance the development of new
and diverse talent.
The financial realities of each film must-and reasonably should-be
allowed to influence the structure of employment arrangements. No one
would be required to perform work on any film, but their desire to do so,
especially if derived from artistic, political or philosophical concerns,
should not be destroyed or barred by overly rigid rules. Each film is
different, and this should apply to its economics as well as its organization
and content.
X. CENTRALIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE
The increasing centralization in the entertainment industry as a whole
raises issues of independence for all concerned.161 Miramax's success with
sex, Lies and Videotape162 in 1989 (with reported domestic box office of
$24.7 million), followed by The Crying Game 63 in 1992 ($62.4 million)
and The Piano'64 in 1993 ($40.2 million)' 65 allowed that company to
survive and to market itself to Disney. Thus, while still distributing
independently produced films, Miramax has mapped out a middle ground
which provides it with substantial capital resources and domestic
distribution strength.
161. See The National Entertainment State, THE NATION, June 3, 1992, at 3-15.
162. SEX, LIES AND VIDEOTAPE (Miramax 1989); The Top 40, THE HOLLYWOOD REP. (1994
Independent Producers & Distributors Special Issue), 1994, at 33.
163. TiE CRYING GAME (Miramax 1992); see The Top 40, supra note 162, at 33.
164. THE PIANO (Miramax 1993); see The Top 40, supra note 162, at 33.
165. These box office figures are from Entertainment Data, Inc. and The Hollywood
Reporter. See The Top 40, supra note 162, at 33.
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The purchase of Turner by Time Warner created serious questions
about what to do with three film production units. Castle Rock, New Line
and Turner Pictures all faced questions of being dissolved, merged, sold, or
controlled. New Line was perhaps the most successful independent
production and distribution company in the prior decade due to films (and
their sequels) like A Nightmare on Elm Street,'6 Teenage Mutant Ninja
Turtles,167 House Party,16 The Mask,1
69 Mortal Kombat,'70 and Seven, 171
but suddenly saw its plan to combine independence with larger scale film
production and distribution endangered. Castle Rock faced the reality of
being purchased by one of the studios, scaling back its operations, and
looking for a new financial structure. Turner Pictures was almost
immediately dissolved into Warner Bros., leaving an operation which had
prided itself on being small, non-bureaucratic and personal as only the
defunct repository of dozens of development projects.
Working outside the studios can be, as described in part above, a
daunting task. Working within the studios can similarly be frustrating and
uncertain, dominated as it is by structures which are far from what's best
for any single motion picture. The increased centralization of the industry
is likely to lead to creative problems and restrictions.'72 Thus, the more
centralized each studio becomes, the more it may turn to independent
producers for different kinds of product. As always, the motion picture
industry seems to work in a cyclical manner with respect to everything
except the seemingly ever upward cost of production and marketing.
166. A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line Cinema 1984).
167. TEENAGE MUrTANT NINJA TURTLES (New Line Cinema 1990).
168. HOUSE PARTY (New Line Cinema 1990).
169. THE MASK (New Line Cinema 1994).
170. MORTAL KOMBAT (New Line Cinema 1995).
171. SEVEN (New Line Cinema 1995).
172. A good example is the complaint to Disney registered by the Chinese government in
December, 1996 over Disney's domestic distribution of Kundun, the biographical film about the
Dalai Lama. With Martin Scorsese directing, Disney indicated it would abide by its contractual
commitments. But what will happen in the future when Disney is again presented with such a
sensitive project? As companies like Disney see their international revenues grow, they tend to
become much more subject to such political pressures. Subsequently, China's Ministry of Radio,
Film And Television directed a memo to three studios allegedly halting deals with those studios
due to Chinese displeasure over Red Comer, Seven Years In Tibet, and Kwuu. Robert W.
Welkos & Maggie Farley, Insulted By Films, Being Orders Halt to Studio Deals, L.A. TIMEs,
Oct. 31, 1997, at Al, A6. Similar issues arise in the imposition of censorship and quotas in
various countries around the world.
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A. Are There Antitrust Laws? Should There Be?
The original effort to "bust" the trusts of the early Twentieth century
was possible to a great extent because of the individual energy, single-
mindedness and political power of Theodore Roosevelt. Nevertheless,
depending upon the nation's (and world's) economy, changes in political
philosophy, and current unemployment, inflation and interest rates, the
attention given to antitrust laws ebbs and flows. When Ronald Reagan
became president in 1981, large businesses believed (rightly) that they had
gained carte blanche to grow, merge and conduct business as they wished.
If anything, the government was there to protect large business from any
regulation or benefits that might remain available to employees, smaller
businesses or consumers.
As a result, communications, broadcasting and entertainment
companies grew larger and merged. The 1948 United States v.
Paramount73 Supreme Court decision and resulting consent decrees had
left the motion picture industry with a stark division between exhibition
and distribution/production. This phenomenon reversed itself in the 1980s
as the studios bought and invested in theaters. In addition, battles arose
before the Federal Communications Commission and in Congress over
various other issues, including whether the television networks could own
their own programming in a world where home video and pay, cable, and
satellite television revenues exceed theatrical box office.
Despite occasional inquiries about specific antitrust issues, with few
exceptions, every merger or large scale purchase seriously pursued in the
entertainment industry has been allowed to proceed. Whether the synergy
sought by Warner Communications and Time (and then Turner), Viacom
and Paramount, or Disney and ABC will lead to better programming, more
efficient distribution, or any other business benefits, "growth for the sake of
growth" seems to have become an acceptable goal. Even with six years of
a Democratic administration, nothing has changed much in antitrust
enforcement.'74
The "free market" argument on this subject leads to interesting
ramifications. For example, one could argue that the voracious growth of
News Corp., Disney, Viacom, Time Warner, and a few other massive
companies will inevitably lead to various units, divisions and talented
executives leaving these behemoths to form their own successful
173. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
174. "And yet, to most Americans, the economic arguments against the trust may matter
less than its offenses against taste." Mark Crispin Miller, Free the Media, THE NATION, June 3,
1996, at 10; see Monroe E. Price, Making Antitrust Work, THE NATION, June 3, 1996, at 28.
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independent companies. Perhaps a new period of privately financed
companies or public offerings will lead to new film production entities.
However, such companies would have to learn from recent failures and
come to grips with problems inherent in working under the shadows of the
studios.
Some form of antitrust analysis needs to occur if the studios are to
know whether they have any legal limits and if the motion picture industry
as a whole is to properly evaluate its direction. Government certainly can
play a part in determining the point, if any, at which it is unsafe for the
public's access to entertainment and educational products to be in the hands
of so few.
B. Changed Government Attitudes Toward Labor Organizations
The Reagan presidency not only frowned on antitrust enforcement but
voraciously attacked labor unions, starting almost at once with an attempt
to break the air traffic controllers' union. While the motion picture
industry's unions are quite different from those in many manufacturing
industries, particularly due to the nature of the work done and the
unionization of highly paid individuals, this anti-union approach has had its
impact even in this industry. However, due to the resources available to the
WGA, DGA and SAG-and their members' sophistication and
education-these organizations have flourished while other unions
suffered. Moreover, "management" (in this case, the studios) can and does
benefit by developing a system in which the guilds and studios work
together to set mutually beneficial rules-which do not take into
consideration the interest of independents. Thus, while the studios have
been virtually free to grow and to impose certain structures, so have the
guilds.
In essence, government has stopped regulating the growth of all
entities in the entertainment industry.
C. The Effect of Overseas Ownership and European Collectivization
The huge impact of studio films is felt around the world. Many
countries have instituted means to limit the pictures available, or attempted
to enhance the likelihood of distribution for local motion pictures. In both
instances, whether as a result of cultural or economic reasons, studio films
are viewed elsewhere as a problem. These issues have intertwined
themselves into a variety of international trade, piracy, copyright, and
cultural questions.
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Censorship boards have been set up in numerous countries, and
quotas have been imposed. These issues are attempts in one way or
another to limit the influence of the "Hollywood Film" and prop up usually
suffering local film industries.
Two distinct events during the last decade have raised interesting
challenges to the studios and, in some cases, have provided opportunities
for non-studio filmmaking.
First, Japanese companies attempted to purchase substantial
American-based assets. Among the highest-profile purchases were Sony's
purchase of first CBS Records and then Columbia/Tri-Star. Later
Matsushita purchased MCA/Universal. As this was happening, Australian
(now U.S.) citizen Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. acquired Twentieth
Century Fox. PolyGram, while not acquiring a studio, began to acquire
independent film companies (Propaganda, Interseope, Egg, Working Title,
A&M) and built a joint venture distribution entity (Gramercy) with
Universal, which it then acquired. (Of course, more recently, Universal
purchased Polygram in order to obtain its substantial music business).
The media and U.S. politicians attacked the perceived threat of
foreign acquisition of U.S. entertainment companies. However, with
Matsushita eventually having sold MCA to Seagram's (interestingly, a
Canadian-based entity), with Polygram being purchased by Universal, and
with Sony's problems and patience with its studio, such concerns have
waned. Nevertheless, some issues still require attention.
The insularity of studio executives and structures clearly proved
inconsistent with "foreign" ownership. This has proved equally true for
U.S. corporations which do not understand the entertainment industry, such
as when TransAmerica bought MGM-UA and when Coca-Cola bought
Columbia. Thus, it is not simply independent filmmakers who find it
difficult to cope with the studio structure. Even with seemingly limitless
resources and power, its owners cannot always manage a film studio.
A second trend is European collectivization, in the form of the
European Union. This organization was originally structured to bring some
amount of free trade and free travel, as well as collective economic
stability, to Europe. With the economic development of Japan and,
increasingly, other Asian countries, Europe saw that cooperation would be
required to compete in the international business world. This has had an
impact on the entertainment industry in part because of the clash of
philosophies regarding copyright and ownership of films.
The English and American view-to allow ownership by the studio or
production entity-is inconsistent with the French attitude regarding
"moral rights" of authors. That approach assumes ownership by those who
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actually "create" a picture. This seemingly esoteric and philosophical
difference has brought about serious disputes over cultural identity, artistic
freedom, copyright, and free trade. It led to major battles in the most recent
GATT trade negotiations (known as the Uruguay Round) and the United
States eventually removed all "cultural" issues from those negotiations to
conclude an agreement at the deadline.
What this has done for independent filmmakers is to cause Europeans
to attempt to set up a schedule of quotas, subsidies, tax advantages, and
other support systems which allow them to work together and to try to limit
the influence of studio pictures. However, because independent
filmmaking by its nature is not limited to Southern California, independents
can join forces with producers, actors and writers from other countries to
take advantage of such subsidies and tax breaks. As a result, substantial
"independent" filmmaking is on the rise in Canada, Australia, Ireland, the
United Kingdom, and the rest of Europe.
XI. DIVERSITY AND INDEPENDENCE
The lack of diversity in film industry content, artists and executives
arose in a number of contexts as a political issue. 7 To some extent, of
course, changes in this area are triggered by demand in the marketplace.
However, "demand" can be artificially created and altered by supply. For
example, when studios produce the same kinds of movies over and over,
the public's desire for those films is assumed.
Naturally, once an original film or a renewed genre becomes
successful, everyone pronounces a change in what consumers want.
Whether those consumers would have been thrilled to see that same film
years earlier if it had been available is something they never had an
opportunity to establish. Generally, whether films starring a greater
diversity 'of actors and actresses or containing unusual themes could
become profitable for the studios is difficult, if not impossible, to prove
under the present system. We know that independent films do spring from
a variety of sources, allow for substantial diversity, and often help highlight
themes that would otherwise never be seen. 76
175. Jesse Jackson has raised this issue at various times, just as Bob Dole and others have
used the issue of film content (for example, in Natural Born Killers) to generate political support.
If progress is to be made, it would seem far more effective to treat this as a civil rights-rather
than a political-issue.
176. This is not a new point. In a January 1939 radio speech, Screen Writers Guild
President Dudley Nichols acknowledged the limits imposed by the studios on film content:
"Hollywood, in its fear of losing profits by making enemies, in its mad desire to appease the
prejudices of every group, has submitted to an ever-tightening censorship under which it becomes
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In addition, when movies are based upon smaller budgets (both for
production and marketing), more chances are taken, since the opportunities
and risk are both smaller. Thus, independent production inevitably allows
for new approaches and unusual themes.
Affirmative action and other social changes have affected hiring in
the entertainment industry. For example, the increased number of women
in law school during the past twenty five years has resulted in a similar rise
in women attorneys, agents and mid-level executives. However, the
growth of diversity in hiring for films has been slow in coming. Recent
statistics have shown a substantial increase in the number of black acting
roles, but have also shown a much smaller increase for other minorities.
Women's roles have increased in features, but this is an extremely slow
process compared to the number of films produced. Moreover, with very
few exceptions, the higher salaried, starring roles and directing jobs tend to
be limited to white males.' 77 Independent production raises such issues of
diversity and, to some extent, provides a training ground for people from
different backgrounds.
Diversity of content can also be enhanced-as argued by the Justice
Department in Paramount by more open distribution systems and,
impliedly, independent production. 71 Perhaps stronger independent
production would have seen the release of films questioning the Vietnam
War while it was being fought. Perhaps, a stronger group of independent
employers could have weakened the blacklist which ravaged so many
brilliant writers and directors beginning with the so-called "Hollywood
Ten" in late 1947.'7 Decentralized production, by also decentralizing
decision-making, increases the chances that all forms of new, different and
risky people and ideas will be given an opportunity to succeed.
impossible to deal with reality." JACOBS, supra note 24, at 507-08.
177. See Ted Johnson, DGA Minority Report Bleak, DAILY VARIETY, June 13, 1997, at 1,
103; David Robb, Who's Hiring, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., June 19-21, 1998, at 21-25. The
DGA's 1995 report on women and minority hiring showed that, while women comprise 28
percent of tape directing work, they are hired for only eight percent of film directing days. Ted
Johnson, DGA Minority Report Bleak, DAILY VARIETY, June 13, 1997, at 103. Meanwhile,
minorities held only 5.9 percent of tape and four percent of film directing days. Id. at 103. The
1996 DGA figures saw the percentage of total work days for women actually drop slightly from
the prior year. Minority work days did increase, with total minority work days still accounting
for only 9.7 percent. David Robb, supra note 177, at 20-21. For the period from 1988-1997,
minorities directed only 7.5 percent of all films. Id.
178. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
179. See FRIEDRICH, supra note 17, at 298-337. This contains a good summary of the 1947
House Un-American Activities Committee hearings and the beginning of the blacklist. Id.
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XII. DISTRIBUTON AND ExHIBmoN: ACCESS DENIED?
A. The Domestic Exhibition Problem
While the studios' historical control of domestic motion picture
theaters ended decades ago, the current situation provides precious little
access to available screens for independent films. The reason for this
scarcity is more complicated than the issue of studio ownership itself,
which has been renewed in recent years. Nevertheless, studios dominate
the most desirable screens.
There have been no recent lawsuits, private or governmental,
asserting that the recent upsurge of studio theater ownership has created
discriminatory booking policies. However, studio films dominate desirable
theaters, particularly during the most valuable holiday and summer
exhibition periods. The number of screens booked for the top five or six
major studio releases often includes half or more of all available screens.
While a release on one thousand screens was a large one a decade
ago, it is now common to see releases on 2,500 to 3,000 and more
screens.80 Some of this can be accounted for by the upgrading and
multiplexing of theaters, which provides many screens with smaller seating
capacities than was normal in the past. Admissions are also up. 8'
Nevertheless, studio releases have become far more extensive.
The studios believe they need such wide releases, given the huge cost
of national saturation marketing and advertising for most studio films. A
studio spending well in excess of twenty million dollars to release a film,
naturally wants to make certain that every potential ticket-buyer can see
that film during its first two weekends. In addition, the mentality of the
"hit film" has changed. The potential revenues for any one hit, particularly
when including sequels, merchandising and increased library value, makes
180. When Lost World, the sequel to Jurassic Park, was released in May, 1997, it reportedly
was released on 3,000 screens. Andrew Hindes, Wow Bow of $93 rail for 'World,' DAILY
VARIETY, May 28, 1997, at 8. Multiplexes often now make an exact screen count difficult. Id.
In any event, the number for Lost World was greater than for any past release and has pushed
most other major releases onto more screens than ever before. This trend continued the following
summer for Godzilla, Armaggedon, and other major releases.
181. "In 1996, there were 1.34 billion theatre admissions, the largest since 1959." Peter M.
Nichols, Land ofthe Cineplex, Home of the Cassette, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997, at 1, 22.
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the search for a Batman,'12 Lethal Weapon,1 3 Jurassic Park,'" or
Titanic, 18 5 the primary goal of the studios.
Only recently have film-goers become generally aware of box office
results, the number of screens on which a film is being released, budgets,
and similar "business" matters. This knowledge seems to alter consumer
decisions. Entertainment and business aspects have become inextricably
locked together, creating a cycle in which few films are released slowly to
build momentum.
A result of this saturation booking release pattern is that
comparatively few theaters are available for smaller or specialized films.
Many of those available screens are older "arthouse" theatres in need of
restoration. 1 6 There is also more competition for these screens, since "(a)s
many as 20 indie films are distributed each weekend, a fact that has
bumped up marketing costs more than 10% in the past year."' 17 Moreover,
since independent films often rely upon word of mouth, a slow building of
momentum, good reviews, and access to a supposedly small "art film"
audience, the lack of available screens makes it extremely difficult for most
independent or foreign language films to reach their audience.' Miramax
Co-Chairman Harvey Weinstein has compared independent releases to
studio releases by pointing out that the studios focus on the opening
weekend, while for Miramax "six weeks into a movie [release] is when you
really have to concentrate, because these movies need nurturing and special
handling .... It's a whole process of seeding the marketplace, going
182. BATMAN (Warner Bros. 1989).
183. LETHAL WEAPON (Warner Bros. 1987).
184. JURASSIC PARK (Universal 1993).
185.TITANIC (Twentieth Century Fox 1997).
186. "There are currently about 400 screens domestically dedicated to arthouse product and
that includes everything from modem multiplexes to decaying calendar operations." Leonard
Klady, The Special Needs of the Speciality Pic Biz, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 13, 1997, at 19.
However, some independent films have been able to book more "mainstream" theatres. For
example, "Miramax's Emma and Gramercy's Fargo could be seen in 848 and 716 theatres,
respectively. These are the kind of numbers that a decade ago were considered respectable for a
mainstream Hollywood picture." Id.; Joseph Steuer, The indes: Too Much of a Good Thing,
THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 9, 1997. However, in the "first nine months of 1997, U.S. indie
acquisitions accounted for just 1.3% of the domestic box office, down 50% from each of the prior
three years." Leonard Kiady, Odds for lndie Pic Distribution Get Longer, DAILY VARIETY, Oct.
8, 1997, at 19.
187. Thom Geier, Hopesfor Hits Broken by Fractured Audiences, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 7,
1999, at 1, 15.
188. For an "in the trenches" description of the effort involved in obtaining distribution for
independent films, especially during the period from 1985 (She's Gotta Have It) to 1994 (Clerks).
See JOHN PIERSON, SPIKE, MIKE, SLACKERS & DYKES 1 (1995).
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through waves and waves of it."' 9 Finally, the skyrocketing cost of print,
radio and television advertising makes it hard for independent and
specialized films to compete.
B. Film Festivals and the Attempt To Gain Public Awareness
Independent films have found success by utilizing film festivals as an
alternate market, promoting films by creating controversy (for example,
Miramax's rating battles), or obtaining Academy Award nominations or
other critical awards to promote a film's release. While these means are
possible, they are difficult for all but the most fortunate of independent
films. One result has been a torrent of submissions to Sundance, Cannes,
Toronto and the few other major film festivals that can make a difference in
the market. Moreover, obtaining Golden Globe and Academy Award
nominations has become big business, requiring substantial trade ads, video
mailings, screenings, and promotion just to obtain such nominations. Thus,
the need to spend money to succeed creates a vicious cycle when
attempting to create a commercial market for an independent film.
While independent film companies have suffered, there also appears
to be a glut of small, independently produced motion pictures. "In 1998,
indeed, there were twice as many independent films" as in 1995 and
"nearly 20% more than in 1997."''0 Over 600 dramatic features were
submitted for consideration by Sundance Film Festival officials for 1997,
primarily for eighteen dramatic film competition slots and 22 "American
Spectrum" screenings.19" ' For the 1998 Sundance Film Festival, 750
"fictional" films were submitted for thirty-two screening positions. 92 By
1999, there were 850 feature submissions for Sundance screening
positions. 93 These odds create a lottery-like situation, a feeling enhanced
by recent Sundance films which obtained high profile distribution.
However, even after obtaining such a cherished screening position, many
Sundance films do not obtain meaningful distribution, or obtain distribution
for a lot less money than actually spent on production. Thus, obtaining
distribution and theatrical exhibition for independent films is a far more
189. Kenneth Turan, The Reel World, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1997, at F1, Fl1 (interviewing
Harvey Weinstein). Miramax's unique success at this is reflected in 1999 Academy Award
winners and domestic box office successes Shakespeare in Love and Life is Beautiful.
190. Thom Geier, Hopes for Hits Broken by Fractured Audiences, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 7,
1999, at 1, 13.
191. Sights & Sounds, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 15, 1997.
192. Todd McCarthy, Leaner, Cleaner Sundance, VARIETY, Dec. 8-14, 1997, at 7, 8, 18,
20.
193. Todd McCarthy, Dance CardFull, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 2, 1998, at 1, 10.
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torturous process than appears from just looking at the success of a few
films.1
94
Active independent production companies attempt to develop and
produce films consistent with the apparent needs and desires of the market.
But many current independent films are made by first-time producers or
directors on shoestring budgets, with artistic motivations-but commercial
dreams. The need for such art and experience is not in question, but there
is little likelihood of the theatrical market seeking out such films.
C. The Shrinking Video Market
The video market has retracted substantially, first in the United States
and then around the world. This has eliminated video distributors and retail
shelf space for many motion pictures. The studios have increased their
video shipments 95 (Disney has shipped more than twenty million units on
a number of sell-through titles, and thirty million units of The Lion King'96)
while over 800,000 rental units of The Rock197 and over 700,000 units of
Die Hard With a Vengeance98 and Pulp Fiction'99 were shipped. 20° The
studios have also begun to create direct sell-through videos like Disney's
Aladdin2r ' sequel. In addition, CD-ROMS and video games have become
video store staples. Shelf space thus fell-and independent films are the
obvious loser.2'0
Smaller exploitation films, which often were shipped directly to
video, have lost much, if not all, of their market. Where smaller action and
martial arts films could be expected to ship between 25,000 and 75,000
units domestically just a few years ago, many of these pictures now sell
194. "Through the first nine months of 1997, U.S. indie acquisitions accounted for just 1.3%
of the domestic box office, down 50% from each of the prior three years." Klady, supra note
186, at 19. Also, according to John Krier of Exhibitor Relations, "The number of screens for
independent film has not increased proportionately with all the specialized films now available."
Andrew Collier & Joseph Steuer, Indie Films: Life in the Cash Lane, THE HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Jan. 16-18, 1998, at 96.
195. Carl DiOrio, Rock Cages Vid Record for Rental Bookings, THE HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Dec. 3, 1996, at 7.
196. Scott Hettrick, Dis to Unleash 'Dalmations' Vid With Huge Push, THE HOLLYWOOD
REP., Feb. 10, 1997, at 1, THE LION KING (Walt Disney Pictures 1994).
197. THE ROCK (Hollywood Pictures 1996).
198. Dm HARD Wrri A VENGEANCE (Twentieth Century Fox 1995).
199. PULP FICTION (Miramax 1994).
200. Carl DiOrio, Rock Cages Video Record for Rental Bookings, THE HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Dec. 3, 1996, at 1.
201. ALADDIN (Walt Disney Pictures 1992).
202. Thomas K. Arnold, Independents'Daze, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1997, at D10.
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well under 20,000 units, and quite often under 10,000 units.2°3 This in turn
caused a number of independent video distributors to go out of business,
eliminating companies that knew how to market and sell such independent
product. It is not accidental that Miramax, for example, despite retaining
its independent approach in acquiring independent films, distributes its
films to the video market through Disney's powerful video division. Thus,
the safety net of video revenues no longer exists for independently
produced films.
D. The Television Boom
The substantial growth in pay and free television has had an impact
on independent production in a number of ways. There has been
substantial new production by Showtirne, HBO, USA, and other pay and
cable channels. This can provide additional work and experience for
independent filmmakers, but it also tends to offer far less independence for
filmmakers, as each of these entities has a view of what subjects, actors,
budget and style works for them and their particular audience. Thus,
employment grows, but not the other attributes of independent production.
Some are optimistic about the increased commercial prospects for
independent films as a result of new cable channels (such as the
Independent Film Channel or the Sundance Channel) and increasing film
exploitation over the Internet. However, such "narrow casting" (that is,
access to more specialized product as sold through catalogues and direct
mail), while certainly pointing toward access for previously unseen
product, also has the effect of "ghettoizing" such independent
programming.
As an example of this concern, many video stores set aside a small
section for "foreign language" films. This appears to be a step forward,
since it helps remind the retailer to acquire a certain number of such
productions, and also helps market that product by letting the consumer
know that there is a place to look for such video rentals. However, this
approach differentiates between all English language and foreign language
product, thus limiting the audience for the latter, no matter how successful
a particular foreign language film might become. In addition, if one non-
English language film (such as II Postino) does especially well, thereby
creating a perceived consumer appetite, the increased number of videos for
203. Independent films have seen a freefall in domestic video sales. See, Collier & Steuer,
supra note 194, at 91. One analyst has reported that independent films rarely sell over 30,000
units, "down from average sales of 60,000 three years ago. He added that smaller films are being
swept out of the market by Hollywood blockbusters." Id. (quoting Tom Adams).
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that title purchased by retailers can automatically reduce the amount of
shelf space in the "foreign language section" available to promote any other
foreign language films. Thus, such differentiation provides some access to
the market, but usually limits that access at the same time.
A similar problem could occur when independent films are televised
on separate "independent" channels, just as they often now are pushed to
the few "art" theaters in most urban areas. This is certainly not an attempt
to criticize the few effective means that exist to provide access to
independents. But the separation of this product from studio films has not
only made it more difficult for some films to get into the marketplace at all,
but it has also created an awareness by consumers of differences between
studio and non-studio product. This can occasionally become a marketing
advantage, but usually creates an artificial ceiling for sales, revenues, or
viewers.
The independent film community must reevaluate this process and
market its product differently and creatively. This challenge has been met
by companies like Miramax and New Line, who approach it in their own
distinct ways. Attempts to include the exhibition, distribution and
production community in any such efforts is a challenge that independents
must meet.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Independent production will never be easy, particularly in light of the
power and resources of the studios. Obtaining distribution for an
independent film is always a difficult challenge. As discussed above, the
studios are, by nature, not engines of diversity, creativity, original
expression or opportunity. They nurture a structure which makes it
difficult for artists to function in any but the most repetitive ways. Some
artists do flourish in such a system. Many do not. There is nothing wrong
with artists attempting to learn how to utilize the studio system to their
advantage. Similarly, those who do not fit in, cannot gain an opportunity,
or who have no interest in working on traditional studio pictures need to be
aware of the overall context in which they operate.
Independent filmmakers can educate one another, organize
information, and develop models of representation and negotiation. They
can attempt to convince the studios, guilds, unions and media at every
opportunity that enhancing independent production is not antithetical to the
success of those large organizations. Some of the ways to do this have
been discussed above. There are many others. To curse the studios for
their success, size and power is of little value to independent and
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international filmmakers. To understand the circumstances and work
within those areas which are untouched by or of no interest to the studios
will provide a myriad of opportunities.
Independence cannot, by its nature, be pursued through a dogmatic,
formalized plan. Each film requires adaptations and compromises.
However, independent companies can be more efficient, move and adapt
more quickly, and take chances to seize short term opportunities. They
must think internationally and strategically. They must utilize every
opportunity and share information with other independent filmmakers.
Cooperation rather than fear, creativity rather than greed, must be the
independent film community's credo.
The creativity of an independent filmmaker cannot stop with the film
itself. Perhaps even more creativity must be applied to the acquisition of
capital, formation of a business plan, licensing of distribution rights, and
marketing of each production made outside the studio system.
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